What Are They Worth? Part 2: Prince Fielder

Brewers fans may not want to read this one, nor fans of the team who is going to sign Prince. You're probably not going to enjoy what I'm going to say here.

As I did last time, I will be looking at first how much Prince is worth, and how much he is going to get.

So how much is Prince Fielder worth, right now? First, it is probably important to note that he is not, in fact, as good as many believe. Don't get me wrong, the guy rakes: three seasons of a 157 or better OPS+, and he's a pretty consistent threat to get on base 40% of the time while pushing 40 home runs with a healthy average. His value is bogged down, however, by all of the things you would expect: he is a big guy (listed at 5'11", 275), and this negatively affects all aspects of his game. He is a terrible fielder, averaging -8 rtot since 2006, and he's even worse as a baserunner. Nobody would be surprised to hear that since 2006 he has an average baserunning value of -5.

Fielder's last three years have produced WARs of 6.1, 2.7, and 5.2, an average of 4.7. UZR has been more kind to Fielder, and as a result his FanGraphs WAR since 2009 is an average of 5.1. I don't mean to take anything away from Fielder, because the dude can hit; but it becomes apparent once you look past the hitting numbers that the guy isn't really an MVP-type, but more of an All-Star type -- not that there's anything wrong with that.

For our purposes here, let's say that Fielder is a 5.0 WAR player. Considering he's only had two seasons above 3.8, that might even be high, but he's more likely to get paid for what he is capable of, so we'll use 5.

The obvious issue with Fielder is his body type. Fielder is a big guy -- like, really big. He has easily the worst body in MLB right now, and big guys don't age well; that's just a fact. For every David Ortiz there's a Mo Vaughn. For every Jim Thome there's an Adam Dunn. Nobody who discusses Fielder can do so without mentioning that body. It is almost certain that he will not
hold up as long as another player of that value type who is in shape.

Ryan Campbell of FanGraphs recently did a study of guys he considered 'heavy' (3.25 pounds per inch of height) versus the average, and found some pretty striking results:

Heavy guys do, in fact, age noticeably worse. To put the chart into simple numbers, here are the ages 27-34 for a heavy player, with 1.0 representing full, peak value, and the other numbers representing a portion of that:

27: 1.0
28: 0.95
29: 0.90
30: 0.83
31: 0.85
32: 0.73
33: 0.56
34: 0.38

As you can see, the aging curve on heavy players is brutal. If we apply that to Fielder right now, his projected value in the next seven years is going to look like:

27: 5.0
28: 4.8
29: 4.5
30: 4.2
31: 4.3
32: 3.7
33: 2.8
34: 1.9

By the time Fielder turns 35, he won't even be an average player anymore, at least according to the average aging trend for players of his body type. And, keep in mind, that his 'body type' is actually much worse than most in that sample. 3.25 lbs per inch of height would make a 6' player weigh 235 pounds: Fielder is listed at 5'11" and 275, and he could even be shorter and heavier than those figures.

Most industry pundits have Fielder getting a six-year deal, though Fielder's agent is Scott Boras, so he'll likely get... six years. Using the above data, in the next six years, Fielder can be projected to amass (fat joke) 24.3 WAR over that span. At $5 MM per win, that's $121.5 MM that he is worth as far as signing him, or an average annual value (AAV) of $20.25 MM.

What is he going to get, though?

Three years ago, the Yankees and Red Sox got into a bidding war for Mark Teixeira. The Yankees ended up winning, and gave Teixeira $180 MM over eight years, an AAV of $22.5. While Teixeira was a better player then that Fielder is now, he was two years older, and this was several years ago, so don't be surprised to see Fielder take anywhere from $23 MM to $25 MM per year. Probably the most cut and dry, easiest contract Fielder could take could be six years and $150 MM. If this happens, a team that signs Fielder would be throwing away approximately $30 MM.

Even more striking is the potential that a team could sign Fielder for seven, or even eight years, with a payout as high as $160 MM - $180 MM. If Fielder plays out to the average big guy projections, he will essentially be done providing value after six years, so a team investing that heavily in Fielder could be in to lose some $50 MM. Tread carefully, Washington.

So there you have it. According to average trends (and keep in mind that Fielder will almost certainly either exceed these or fall short of them; but I wish to reiterate that he is as likely to do one as the other), the value that Fielder can be expected to produce warrants $121.5 MM over the next six years. Anything more than that, in either years or dollars, is a significant risk for the team, and this is something that needs to be taken into account before anything is decided with Prince.

Expected length of contract: six years
Projected value for those years: $121.5 million
Expected salary for those years: $150 million

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What Are They Worth? Part 1: Albert Pujols

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What Are They Worth? Part 1: Albert Pujols

I would like to look at the top-five free agents of the 2012 offseason and take a look at what they might a) be worth, and b) actually get; it is safe to assume that these will not be the same figures. The five free agents I will be looking at are, in order, Albert Pujols, Prince Fielder, Jose Reyes, CJ Wilson, and, because I'm a fun guy, Yu Darvish. Without further gilding the lily, and with no more ado, here we go:

Albert Pujols is a bad man. He is, without the tiniest inkling of a doubt, the player of the post-steroids era. He has a career OPS well north of 1.000, is the greatest fielding 1B of his generation, if not all-time, and had seven consecutive seasons with a WAR of at least 8.2. He is roughly halfway through his playing career and St. Louis recently unveiled a statue of the man. What I'm trying to say is, he's pretty good.

The first part of this will be analyzing solely what he should be worth in terms of sheer value, so the fact that he is a franchise player and a living legend will not come into play here, other than the obvious fact that he is those things for a reason.

How good is Albert Pujols right now? He had a pair of monster years in 2008 and 2009 (9.6 and 8.8 WAR, respectively) in what is conceivably his prime, before hitting what now appears to be a decline. In 2010 he posted a 7.1 WAR, and this year posted a 5.7 (after extrapolating a 5.4 WAR for a freak injury). Many years ago Bill James employed what he called his 'favourite toy', which weighed more recent seasons heavier, simply by putting them into a simple equation more times. So, to find what kind of value Pujols can be expected to produce, you would simply use the equation, (3(5.7)+2(7.1)+8.8)/6 = 6.7. Okay, so, for the purposes of this exercise, Pujols is a 6.7 WAR player, as he is, sitting at home playing with his kids as of this writing.

The biggest issue with Pujols is his age. There is some controversy and speculation that he may be playing under an assumed age, which I will address momentarily. The more pressing matter of his age is that he is going to turn 32 in January, which is an obvious age of decline, even for the greats -- Ruth, Williams and Gehrig all had one of their top-five seasons by WAR after age 31, but Gehrig's was his fifth-best, Ruth's was at age 32, and Ted Williams simply gave Father Time a backhand and sent him on his way, like he did with fastballs, Florida bonefish, and two wives. Pujols isn't these guys, but the point is, even legends of the game age, and even they were on the way down after passing age 30.

The Hardball Times have done some impressive work on the subject of aging, and while I don't love you all enough to cut and paste and cut and paste and paste their exact data on here, they drew up (in the link provided) several plots of player aging. I encourage you to read their article(s), but what we will be using is the data for players with at least 5000 PA (ie: good players) from 1980-2008 (ie: modern players). This gives us the following important data, which is represented in value, where 1.0 represents full, peak value, and the other numbers represent what percentage of that full value is, on average, achieved:

25: 0.92
26: 0.96
27: 0.99
28: 1.00
29: 1.00
30: 1.00
31: 0.99
32: 0.99
33: 0.98
34: 0.92
35: 0.90
36: 0.87
37: 0.83
38: 0.80
39: 0.74
40: 0.70

So, Albert is, as we decided earlier, a 6.7 WAR player. Because he is in clear decline, I do not feel that starting from his prime (something of a 9.2 WAR from 2003-2009) is prudent, but rather a 6.8 extrapolated from the above data and his current value. Using these two things, his expected aging curve for the next nine years looks something like this:

32: 6.7
33: 6.7
34: 6.3
35: 6.0
36: 5.9
37: 5.6
38: 5.4
39: 5.0
40: 4.7

This does not mean that Pujols is going to put up a Hall of Fame career over the next nine years; this is a projection of his value assuming he stays healthy, and assuming one other thing that I mentioned earlier: that he will really be turning 32 this winter.

Pujols, for various reasons, has been considered an age liar for much of his career. He's a big guy, he balded in his 20s, and, most importantly, he did things he shouldn't have been able to in his amateur career. This is not a smoking gun, but he is a Dominican, and there are concerns, and considering that he is likely to be an investment of several hundred million dollars, these are questions worth asking. But, let's continue on the path down which we were headed.

Injuries are the main concern when handing out a contract like this. Aging will obviously happen, but does anybody think that Alex Rodriguez would have gone from MVP to league-average in two years simply because of age? Probably not. However, based on a number of factors (Pujols' track record, his position, the fact that teams will have insurance against his contract), we will proceed here like he will be healthy for the duration.

Dave Cameron at FanGraphs actually just wrote an explanation of Linear Dollars Per Win, which explains the value of a win (about $5 million in 2012), and for years going forward. Applied to Pujols' expected production, this is how much value, in dollars, he can be expected to provide per year:

Year-Age-WAR($/Win) = Total Dollar Value(Value in 2012 dollars)
2012-32-6.7(5.00) = 33.5
2013-33-6.7(5.25) = 35.2 (33.5)
2014-34-6.3(5.51) = 34.7 (31.5)
2015-35-6.0(5.79) = 34.7 (30.0)
2016-36-5.9(6.08) = 35.9 (29.5)
2017-37-5.6(6.38) = 35.7 (28.0)
2018-38-5.4(6.69) = 36.1 (27.0)
2019-39-5.0(7.04) = 35.2 (25.0)
2020-40-4.7(7.39) = 34.7 (23.5)

As you can see, Pujols, in terms of actual value, will be generating roughly $35 MM of value per year. As time goes by, as in all things, that $35 MM will become less and less valuable -- Yogi Berra famously said "A nickle ain't worth a dime anymore." -- but you can see by the 2012 value approximations, that he will still be generating a ton of value by anybody's standards (keep in mind that, every year, about twice as much value is generated as is paid out, so everything is relative -- what a guy is worth is not what he is going to get paid).

So, after all of that, how much is Albert Pujols worth? You can see there how much his hypothetical contributions will be worth, but he is going to get paid in 2012 dollars, so those are the figures we will use. Length of contract is the issue here. The longer the contract goes, the better value is being provided by this version of Pujols. Of course, the longer it goes, the odds increase exponentially that Pujols will hit a sharp decline or have a severe injury; the aging curve I provided is an average -- every player is different, and no player is exempt.

Optimally, Pujols would take a seven-year deal. It is after seven years that his expected production begins decreasing more sharply. Over this time (2012-2018), by what we have discussed, he will generate some $213 MM of value, with an average annual value (AAV) of $30.4 MM. That, ladies and gentleman who have stuck with me thus far, is what Albert Pujols is worth.

But how much will he get paid? This is kind of where the analysis stops and the speculation begins. Some comparisons are Alex Rodriguez' 2007 deal ($275 MM/10 years), Joe Mauer's new contract ($184 MM/8 years), and Mark Teixeira's 2008 signing ($180 MM/8 years). In those three cases you have two free agents, one considered his generation's top talent, one franchise face, and a couple in similar age territory as Pujols.

I think Pujols' contract will resemble a mix of Teixeira's and Rodriguez'. Teixeira was like a poor man's Pujols, an offensive threat with a golden glove. While Teixeira was three years Pujols' junior when he went to free agency, Pujols is this generation's best player, which is where the A-Rod comp comes into play:

I am predicting eight years at an AAV of $27.5 MM, or $220 MM. He may go as low as 25, probably specifically with St. Louis, and there you have it. Ideally, 7 years, $213 MM, in reality, 8 years, $200-220 MM. Pujols ends up with one more year of security than he would get in a perfect (owner's) world, but makes a few million dollars less per year.

Expected length of contact: Eight years
Expected value from those years: $228 million
Expected actual salary: $220 million

In any case, the time for speculation is fast drawing to a close. Clean up, look sharp; it's the Hot Stove season, kids.

Building a "Winning Culture"

One would think that Bud Selig is composing a drama that none of us is aware of with how things have gone down in the Theo Epstein scenario the past few weeks.  First, there were, as expected, some spotty rumors that seemed like random shots in the dark from a few bloggers and writers.  Then, Cubs fans watched as the Cardinals and Brewers both advanced to the NLCS, which is a pretty low blow from the baseball gods.  However, those spotty rumors suddenly began to gather momentum, and that snowflake-sized chance that Epstein might actually leave his hometown Red Sox for the Cubs turned into a full-on avalanche.  The Cubs were granted permission to talk with Epstein, and it didn't take long for reports of Theo in Starbucks in Chicago to surface, followed by Theo agreeing to a sparkly, new five-year deal with the Northsiders.  So, the Cardinals decide to advance the World Series, in the middle of it comes Epstein's news conference, and then suddenly the Cardinals win a World Series.  In the Dark Knight, one of the popular quotes is, "The night is darkest just before the dawn."  Is that how Cubs fans feel?  Yeah, a lot of them probably do feel that way.  Thankfully, the Astros were bad enough to make it so the WORST possible scenario didn't happen, but a 5th place finish in the dreadful NL Central for the Cubs and a World Championship after an improbable run for the Cardinals is about as bad as it gets for a Cubs fan.  So is the dawn coming now for this franchise?

Enter: Theo Epstein... and his buddies Jed Hoyer and Jason McLeod.  Yup, Theo went and got the band back together from his glory years with the Boston Red Sox, when the team could seemingly do no wrong as they hit on a lot of free agent contracts and developed a farm system that was as good as any in MLB.  The Ricketts family had one goal in their GM (or what turned out to be...presidential...) search, and that was to go and get someone with player development experience from a winning franchise.  Who fits that mold better than Theo?  Nobody that was realistically available.  Theo's first move was indeed a dandy as he flipped a PTBNL for his buddies Jed Hoyer and Jason McLeod from the San Diego Padres.  These two bring a lot of experience to the table.  Hoyer was, for all intents and purposes, one of Theo's right hand men in Boston, and now he has gone and gotten GM experience on his own in San Diego.  McLeod, on the other hand, has the majority of his expertise in the scouting and player development parts of organizations.  He was the key figure in Boston's drafts in the mid-2000's as the organization brought up gems like Jonathan Papelbon, Jacoby Ellsbury, Dustin Pedroia, Jon Lester, and Clay Buchholz.  A core like that is nothing to shake a stick at, and no core of players brought up through the system as probably been seen since the likes of Jeter, Posada, and Rivera came up with the Yankees in the mid-1990's.

So what?  They're just executives.  They don't play the games on the field, right?  Well, yeah.  They don't.  However, they are the ones responsible for piecing the best roster possible.  While the Red Sox collapsed in September in 2011, let's be realistic.  That kind of roster in the NL Central probably wins 100 games at a minimum, even with the collapse-like September.  That is what Theo and his buddies are looking to do.  Currently, no farm in the Central is overly strong, nobody has close to the revenue stream that the Cubs have, and frankly, the central is a division where sometimes it only takes 90 wins to grab the crown.

Cubs sucked in 2011, and it's not like they're going to win anything in 2012, so why should we care?  Well, let's be realistic, here.  The Cubs have 60+ million to spend this off season, are keeping their few good prospects in the Theo compensation negotiations, and have younger players like Castro, Soto, Garza, etc to at least create the threat of winning games.  Who knows what Theo does this off season?  60 million's a lot to spend.  Bring in Fielder and a couple of average starters, and the Cubs are probably a .500 team after one off season of moves.  Nobody is expecting a division crown in the first year, or even an above .500 record.  McLeod running the draft will probably have his first group of guys up in 2014, so looking for the Cubs to succeed in the 2013-2014 range is probably most realistic if you're looking for an early date.  Otherwise, 2015 is a good year.  Castro will be 25, Garza will be 31, and a guy like Fielder would be 32.  Personally, I don't know what to expect.  I've never seen the Cubs run by overly intelligent personnel.  I can just hope that the Cubs are creative as possible in the process of cleaning up the mess that Jim Hendry left.  Perhaps we see this in 2012 and beyond:

It's Time to Feel Bad for the Orioles

Andy MacPhail has done some great things in baseball. He led the Minnesota Twins to a pair of championships in 1987 and 1991, and built something resembling a competitive franchise for the Cubs from 1994-2006. Then he went to Baltimore, and things became a joke.

After several years of failing to develop quality starting pitching, despite a laundry list of exciting young pitchers (Bedard, Cabrera, Loewen, Guthrie, Tillman, Britton, Arrieta, Matusz), and, as a result, failing to build a competitive team in the tough AL East, MacPhail stepped down from his post as President of Baseball Operations last month, much to the joy of Orioles fans. While it is a shame he was never able to put together a good team in a great baseball town, this is something that all teams experience at one time or another: a GM simply failing at his job, for reasons leading back to him, or otherwise. What is sad is the ensuing circus of trying to find a replacement for MacPhail.

The most well-known example is Tony LaCava, which occurred earlier this week. LaCava is respected as one of the best talent evaluators in the sport, and, since his promotion to Blue Jays Director of Player Development in 2009, has shown great administrative skills. He has interviewed for GM positions in the past, and along with the White Sox' Rick Hahn and Texas' Thad Levine, is viewed as a top prospective GM.

LaCava nailed his interviews with Baltimore brass and was allowed to meet with Orioles owner Peter Angelos, at which point he was offered the position of Orioles General Manager. He turned it down.

Keith Law recently said that, aside from geographic reasons, he has never heard of an executive turning down a promotion to the position of General Manager. While I'm sure there have been instances, it speaks to the rarity of the event. The Orioles job, on the outside, should not be a tough one to take. They have some very exciting good young players. Matt Wieters might be the best defensive catcher in the AL, Adam Jones looks like a star, and Manny Machado is one of the top prospects in the sport. There is talented pitching there that, while it hasn't panned out yet, likely has a future. Much worse, though, is that the job isn't unappealing on the outside -- the turn-off is behind the front office doors.

There is a reason Baltimore has failed as a franchise despite decent drafting and the ability to spend money: they are poorly run at the major league level. MacPhail has failed to modernize his front office in almost every way: statistical analysis, international scouting and spending, even spending in the draft. Baltimore is an archaic front office, and it needs to be revived. But, ok, lots of front offices are run 'old-school', but they either make it work or slowly get with the program, what's the problem here?

Peter Angelos.



The reason LaCava did not take the job is because one condition was that he wanted, foolishly, to be able to run his front office. He wanted to modernize (remember, he cut his administrative teeth with the uber-creative Blue Jays) Baltimore, which included letting many of Angelos' 'old boys' go, in an attempt to run a more efficient program. Angelos said no. LaCava walked away from Baltimore, said all the right things in the ensuing interview, and received a standing ovation when he walked into Toronto's offices the next day.

The situation that this revealed was as disturbing as the ensuing trend. The men working under the Baltimore GM are untouchable. They have a direct line to ownership, and would essentially be running the asylu-er, show. As Keith Law said, no executive with self-respect is going to take that job -- and none of them are.

Dodgers Assistant GM De Jon Watson has declined to even interview for the position. The Twins (one has to assume, at his request), denied permission for the Orioles to speak to VP of Player Personnel Mike Radcliffe. The Orioles obtained permission to speak with Yankees scouting director Damon Oppenheimer and Red Sox Scouting Director Allard Baird, but both have yet to set up an interview with them. Rick Hahn and Tampa Bay GM Andrew Friedman have both failed to respond to Baltimore's advances, and the Orioles' offseason began with being spurned by Jerry DiPoto, who took the Angels job instead. Buster Olney has stated several times that Baltimore is not viewed within the industry as a positive work environment, and claimed on Twitter Friday morning that: 'What is happening in multiple cases is that possible candidates for the Orioles' job are telling others they are not interested.'

Perhaps most terrifyingly, the Orioles are now interviewing their Director of Baseball Operations, Matt Klentak (more of the same mediocre management and results), and former Expos and Red Sox GM, and founding father of the Israeli Baseball League, Dan Duquette.

Unfortunately, it appears that the Orioles' problems have less to do with on-field talent and even the front office personnel than they do with ownership. Their issue goes straight to the top; it's turtles, all the way down. Until he relinquishes his grasp on the club or has a radical shift in management methodology, the Orioles are in bad shape.

Bandwagon jumping is usually viewed in a negative light, but for all you Maryland fans, there are some exciting things happening down in DC.

10:40 PM ET Friday: Orioles Failure Update: Baird has officially declined to interview with the Orioles.

Saturday Orioles Failure Update: Olney knows of about "a dozen assistant-level executives" that have passed on interviewing for the Orioles' still vacant GM job.