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Saturday, February 2, 2013

A Tribute to Ron Santo (Guest Post on "The Payoff Pitch")

To understand exactly what Ron Santo's mark on baseball has been, you almost have to be a Cubs fan (a reason why I'm guessing NufCed has asked me to write this article).  Everyone knows that Santo was a great third baseman, and most people can probably tell you that he was the long-time color guy on Cubs radio on WGN.  However, neither of those things are what define Santo.  Being a hall of famer isn't what Santo was about.  Being a radio announcer isn't what Santo was about.  So what was Ron Santo about?  Well, it comes down to two things: perseverance and a love for the Cubs so deep that it was and will forever be unmatched.
 
Before Ron Santo can be talked about as one of the greatest third basemen to ever play, it's necessary to talk about the troubles that Santo faced as an individual.  At 18 years old, Santo was diagnosed with juvenile diabetes and was given a life expectancy of 25 years.  While he was able to deal with the condition for most of his career, he eventually would have to have the lower parts of both of his legs amputated.  Rather than be damaged by this fact, Santo used his condition to help raise money for the Juvenile Diabetes Research Foundation.  From 1979 until his death, he helped raise $65 million for the cause.  Despite being given the 25 year life expectancy, Santo lived a strong life until his death on December 2nd, 2010 at the age of 70 years old.  His efforts to raise money for juvenile diabetes research served as a foundation for many research efforts to come.
 
While his raising money for finding a cure for juvenile diabetes will always be his greatest achievement, Santo's legacy will always be as "the greatest Cubs fan who ever lived."  Nobody, and I mean *nobody*, loved the Chicago Cubs as much as Ron Santo.  How much did he love them?  Well, Santo became the first ever player to invoke 10 and 5 no-trade rights in the major leagues when he blocked a trade to the California Angels.  His love for the Cubs poured out through his work in the broadcast booth as well.  Even though most radio announcers are asked to be as fair as possible, Santo would frequently cheer for the Cubs while calling games on WGN radio.  How much of a Cubs fan was he?  Well, in the franchise's long list of cursed moments and unfortunate displays, Santo is the center.  In 1969, during one of the most unlikely collapses of all time, a black cat walked in front of Santo as he was on deck to hit.  On the day he died, Cubs fans mourned the loss of their leader.
 
What Santo is know most for in the baseball community is his play as a third baseman.  Santo would frequently click his heels after Cubs wins that frequently came because of his efforts.  Santo recorded a career .976 OPS in victories along with 211 of his 342 career home runs.  Despite being a fantastic offensive third baseman who posted 62.4 WAR on offense in his career, Santo was best know for his play in the field.  He was a hard-working, gritty, smooth-handed fielder who would frequently dive to knock balls down and throw on to first to get the runner.  It really is too bad how overlooked Santo is as a player.  He led the league in walks 4 times, on-base percentage 2 times, sacrifice flies three times, and triples once.  He finished with a career OPS+ of 125 with over 1,100 career walks and a total rWAR of 70.
 
So really, when you think of Ron Santo and his place in baseball history, don't think first of him as a hall-of-fame third baseman.  Think of him as a humanitarian and the ultimate fan of the game of baseball.  You will be truly missed, Ron Santo.  May your legacy be strong and may your soul rest in peace.

BBR^2 2013: Part One- 2012 Review and Salvador Perez

As some of you may know, last year I ran a series on this blog called "Breakout, Bust, or Rebound?" in which I featured predictions for certain players.  Reader response to the series seemed to be positive, and looking back on the articles the results were quite good.  Therefore, I've brought the series back for 2013 as we get ready for pitchers and catchers to report in the coming weeks.  This year I am expanding BBR by adding a second R to the title representing the word "Repeat."  Last year I got caught up in my article about Matt Kemp by not having a word to apply to what I wanted to say about him.  He didn't bust, he wasn't about to breakout, and it's not like he was rebounding from anything.  All I wanted to say was that I expected him to "Repeat" by following up a great season with another great season.  With that in mind, let's take a quick look at what I predicted for players last year:
 
Howie Kendrick (Breakout, but more "Repeat"):

 
.291 BA/83 runs/14 HR/92 RBI/14 SB
 
Actual (Repeat):
 
.287 BA/57 runs/8 HR/67 RBI/14 SB (wound up spending a lot of time 1-2 spots lower in the order than I anticipated)
 
Johnny Cueto (Bust):
 
6.30 K/ 2.71 BB/ 0.99 HR/ .282 BABIP/ 43% GB/ 9.4 HRFB
 
3.99 xFIP/ 3.85 tERA/ 4.02 SIERA/ 2.2 fWAR
 
Actual (Breakout):
 
http://www.fangraphs.com/statss.aspx?playerid=6893&position=P#battedball
 
David Freese (Breakout):
 
640 PA/ .310 BA/ .374 OBP/ .471 SLG/ .845 OPS (131 OPS+)/ 4.3 fWAR
 
Actual (Breakout):
 
567 PA/ .293 BA/ .372 OBP/.467 SLG/ .839 OPS (129 OPS+)/ 4.1 fWAR
 
Joe Mauer (Rebound):
 
140 G/ 590 PA/ .325 BA/ .370 OBP/ .450 SLG (128 OPS+)/ 6.1 WAR (5.6 oWAR/ 0.5 dWAR)- 78% G at C
 
Actual (Rebound):
 
147 G/ 641 PA/ .319 BA/ .416 OBP/ .446 SLG (141 OPS+)/ 4.1 WAR (4.9 oWAR/-0.9 dWAR)- 50.3% G at C
 
Ryan Vogelsong (Bust):
 
140 IP/ 3.58 ERA (106 ERA+)/ 6.40 K/9/ 3.58 BB/9/ 1.3 fWAR
 
Actual (Repeat):
 
189 IP/ 3.37 ERA (103 ERA+)/ 7.5 K/9/ 2.9 BB/9/ 2.6 fWAR
 
Andrew McCutchen (Breakout):
 
.275 BA/ 95 Runs/ 27 HR/ 95 RBI/ 25 SB
 
Actual (Breakout):
 
.327 BA/ 107 Runs/31 HR/96 RBI/ 20 SB
 
Adam Dunn (Rebound)- Rebound (didn't actually provide numbers as this was the 1st of the BBR articles)
 
Hanley Ramirez (Rebound):
 
.280 BA/ 87 Runs/ 20 HR/ 85 RBI/ 25 SB
 
Actual (Rebound):
 
.257 BA/ 79 Runs/ 24 HR/ 92 RBI/ 21 SB
 
Matt Kemp (Repeat):
 
.310 BA/ .382 OBP/ .553 SLG/  .935 OPS (160 OPS+)/ 7.5 WAR
 
Actual (Repeat- minus injury):
 
.303 BA/ .367 OBP/ .538 SLG/ .906 OPS (147 OPS+)/ 3.5 fWAR
 
Madison Bumgarger (Breakout):
 
220 IP/ 8.65 K/9/ 1.91 BB/9/ 2.95 xFIP/ 47.0% GB/ 35.0% FB/ 6.4 fWAR
 
Actual (Repeat):
 
208 IP/ 8.25 K/9/ 2.12 BB/9/ 3.45 xFIP/47.9% GB/ 33.3% FB/ 3.4 fWAR
 
So really, I did very well with position players and completely flopped on the pitchers.  This doesn't surprise me, especially given fangraphs' recent research into FDP wins and the revelation that LOB% is a significant part of pitching that needs to be taken into account.  I'm not making any excuses however, since that's something that anyone could have considered when making predictions and I admit to missing it.  That said, I'm pretty proud of my results and would like to do it again for 2013.  Let's get to our first 2013 issue: breakout candidate Salvador Perez.
 
BBR^2 Part One: Salvador Perez, C, Kansas City Royals
 

At some point last year, you probably heard or read about my love of Salvador Perez and how much of a young star I think he is going to be.  A lot of people will probably disagree with me, but I think he's got the strongest throwing arm in the Major Leagues at any position.  The evidence?  Last year he set the Royals' pickoff record with 8 career pickoffs in only 113 career games at catcher.  That's 11.5 pickoffs per 162 games! (for context, Yadier Molina had 5 in 136 games at catcher last year, a rate of 6 per 162) What else?  Last year he led the American League by catching 42% of base runners trying to steal.  That's close to Yadier's career rate of 45%.  In short, Perez has the running game on lock down by himself.  As a result of this, the returns on his defensive rates are pretty remarkable (1.8 dWAR, 10 defensive runs saved, and a 5.4 UZR in 113 games).  However, it's not just his throwing arm that makes Perez a breakout candidate.  To understand why he's the lead off player for this year, we need to look at what he's done in the majors offensively:
 
115 G/ .311 BA/ .339 OBP/ .471 SLG/ 119 wRC+/ 4.1% BB/ 10.2% K/ .160 ISO
 
Mix in his remarkable defensive numbers and Perez has already produced 4.1 fWAR in his career.  That's 5.78 fWAR per 162 games.  So really, the first question that comes to mind is, "With numbers this good, how could he possibly break out?"  Well for one, he plays in Kansas City and is a relative unknown around the league.  Second, his 115 games are spread out over two seasons, so we haven't yet seen what he can do over a full season of wear and tear.  That being said, I think it's reasonable to assume that Perez can hit for a high average, hit for a ton of power, and provide that excellent defense behind the plate.  The next question then becomes a matter of sustainability.  To start to look into that, we'll consider Perez' BIP rates:
 
1.40 GB/FB ratio/ 25.8% LD (not a typo)/ 43.3% GB/ 30.9% FB/ 11.5% HR/FB
 
Basically, Salvador hits a ton of line drives and absolutely smashes the ball.  This is no doubt due to his great strength and the ferocity with which he can swing the bat.  However, Perez does have the reputation of being a bit of a hacker at the plate.  But really, it's not like Perez has awful discipline at the plate.  He has positive win values against fastballs, sliders, and changeups in his short time in the majors.  This suggests that he typically can recognize what is coming, but he doesn't have the patience to wait for that one perfect pitch to hit.  This is the biggest reason I believe he ends up hitting so many ground balls.  He makes contact with 86.2% of pitches outside the zone that he swings at, but since those pitches are out of the zone, my guess is that a lot of the resulting contact is weak and rolled over.  Knowing this, I think Perez' offensive approach is pretty sensible.  He recognizes pitches, has great power, and hits a bunch of line drives.  I think this will lead to a bunch of future seasons with 20-25 HR and a whole bunch of doubles, keeping his ISO high and his BB% low.  All of this now considered, this is what I expect from Perez over a season of about 145 games in 2013:
 
145 G/ .305 BA/ .334 OBP/ .495 SLG/ .190 ISO/ 4.2% BB/ 10.5% K/ 8.5 UZR/ -3.0 BSR/ 5.0 fWAR
 
Fantasy Value
 

Ah, we finally come to the part that people actually care about.  As a precursor to this part of the write-up, I'll say that I drafted Salvador Perez with the second-to-last pick in the 14th round of the competitive league I'm in on the message board I frequent.  Since he's not yet established, my guess is that Perez will be taken late in most leagues that don't feature a keeper aspect.  I think that Perez is easily the #1 option for bench catcher, and I think he's a good option in BA and OPS leagues for the UTIL spot since he gives you flexibility at catcher.  I might go far as to say that one of the better fantasy strategies this year is to ignore catcher in the early rounds, build the other parts of your offense, and then snag up Perez as your 8th or 9th offensive option.  Why am I saying all of this?  Well, let's look at what Perez did in fantasy last year in his limited time:
 
.301 BA/ 38 runs/ 11 HR/ 39 RBI/ 0 SB/ .798 OPS
 
Projected out over a full season, that's roughly:
 
.301 BA/ 72 runs/ 21 HR/ 83 RBI/ 0 SB/ .798 OPS
 
Those numbers are really good from a late round draft pick, especially at the catcher position.  Given that I expect guys like Eric Hosmer, Mike Moustakas, and other Royals offensive players to bounce back, I think those run numbers and RBI totals could be even higher, though I think it's safe to assume that Perez will be right around those numbers in 2013.  Now it's time to get to my fantasy predictions for him for 2013:
 
.305 BA/ 75 runs/ 23 HR/ 87 RBI/ 0 SB/ .829 OPS
 
Optimistic?  Yes.  Unrealistic?  Absolutely not.  Perez has the potential to be one of (if not the) best catchers in the league in the future.  Without looking into it incredibly deeply, I think Perez might be the steal of the draft for whoever takes him.  I would give him a pretty early look in keeper leagues, and I'd start considering him as early as round 10 in standard leagues depending on who you are playing with.  If you're looking for strategy, here's what I did in my early, slow-progressing fantasy draft: I took Joe Mauer in round 3, knowing he had C/1B status and thus will play more than most catchers.  This is an overdraft by most measures, but I did this planning to target Perez in the later rounds.  Now I'll have a C/1B/UTIL rotation of Joe Mauer, Ike Davis, and Salvador Perez.  I figure I can get plenty of HR and RBI from Davis and Perez, a strong .800+ OPS from all three players, and a solid number of runs with each player.  Another way to go about it, as mentioned earlier, would be to ignore the catcher spot in the first 9 founds while stocking up on all other offensive positions and possibly grabbing either a couple starters or perhaps a reliever.  This strategy, however, does depend on your ability to get Perez, because catcher will be extremely weak at this point in the draft.
 
So there, we have the first edition of BBR^2.  I officially stamp Salvador Perez as a breakout candidate for the 2013 season.

Thursday, January 31, 2013

PED Scandal vs. the Miami Marlins: Which is Worse for MLB?

While aimlessly browsing twitter the last few days and listening to Tool albums on repeat, I interacted with the so-called "blogger in chief" of NBC's Hardballtalk baseball blog Craig Calcaterra.  We had a small bit of back-and-forth on the issues surrounding the popular Alex Rodriguez fiasco that the baseball media is pushing at the moment.  However, the most interesting part of my interaction with Calcaterra came when he posed a simple (well maybe, but probably not) question to his twitter followers:
 
"Which institution is worse for baseball: Biogenesis Lab or the Marlins?"
 
I would have to imagine that the immediate reaction from most fans would be that the Biogenesis Lab scandal is worse for the game.  Simply put, the common fan is likely incredibly tired of constantly hearing about PED and might consider MLB's credibility severely weakened for how it has handled the issue of PED in the past.  The fallout of the Mitchell Report is a changed league where pitchers have emerged and the league has gotten away from the positive allure of "chicks dig the long ball."  Then again, we're faced with the other simple fact that I don't have many personal friends who are fans of the game that don't absolutely detest Jeffrey Loria and what he has done to Marlins fans (among other people).  To get the root of the question at hand, it's important to understand what is at stake in each scenario.
 
First Side: Biogenesis Lab PED Scandal
 
Anyone that's kind or bored enough to be reading this is probably familiar with the Mitchell Report and the media-dubbed "Steroid Era" of baseball history.  To spare some time, the short version of that story is this: players use illegal substances, fans highly enjoy following results, people get caught with substances, Congress gets involved, MLB handles situation miserably, and fans go home sad and confused.  Now, to this point the Miami clinic PED scandal hasn't been revealed to be as widespread as the steroid era supposedly was.  In fact, the names listed to this point are so few and far between that there's some sliver of hope that this might actually not blow up in the face of the league.  The full extent might end up in a few 50 game suspensions and the shutting down of a PED operation.  At best, that's the footnote in baseball history and all we have to deal with.  Then again, there's the possibility that this clinic gets linked not only to more players, but to more clinics.  The suddenly we've got a big, possibly nationwide, scenario where MLB has to do some serious thinking about the future handling of PED users.
 
Now, let's pause for a second.  Why are PED bad for the game?  A simple question that honestly doesn't get asked enough.  The answer most will come up with (and that I tend to agree with) is that I would prefer to have an ideal world where Barry Bonds does what Barry Bonds did without having to take any kind of substance.  However, that's really the extent of the problem, isn't it?  PED are bad because the media says they are bad, the league says they are bad, and fans have been conditioned to believe they are bad.  Just a thought: these things being true doesn't make PED inherently bad.  In fact, it could pretty easily be argued that PED are good for the game of baseball.  After all, PED are intended to do positive things for the body such as increasing strength, endurance, and the ability to recover quickly from injury.  All this does is make it so that players might be able to do their jobs better.  What modern company is going to succeed while holding its employees back like that?  A better question: how does an entertainment company (which is all that MLB is, and nothing more) succeed without its entertainers?  Would rap not be better off had Tupac and Notorious B.I.G been around longer?  Would Hollywood be the same if Morgan Freeman had lived many decades earlier and thus not been given the opportunity to act?  The point is that PED are intended to increase ability and keep players on the field, thus enhancing the product on the field.  Bud Selig's career is going to be defined by two things: PED and innovation.  Why were PED cast aside as a negative?  As someone who has worked for a baseball data company and is going to continue work with another, I have to say that I'm involved in the business of gaining a competitive edge.  After all that's what scouting reports are used for, that's what the SABR movement has been about, and that's why guys like Bill James and Tom Tango receive jobs with teams: they are really good at using their resources to gain a competitive edge.
 
Really, this all is why this side of the argument just doesn't seem all that bad to me.  So what if a few players are found to have used PED and are suspended?  Are people really naive enough to be surprised or angered by this news?  The last 10 years in baseball history (the post-"Moneyball" era, as I like to call it) have been about utilizing resources to compete in a dynamic industry that demands perfection.  Fans are becoming more open-minded about enhancing the product through statistical analysis, video technology through replay, and other efforts.  In my opinion, this will eventually happen with PED if the media and MLB stop trying to tar and feather individuals who are just trying to be the best that they can be at their jobs.  I wear glasses to increase my ability to see, thus improving my ability to read, write, type, and analyze baseball players.  They *gasp* enhance my performance and I'm a better person for it.  Is this really all that different than PED use? Most will say no, but I believe that to be the byproduct of the modern age.  In short, the Biogenesis Lab is probably going to be a minor footnote in baseball history.  Baseball is always going to be all about its history, but the game in this modern age is about innovation and improvement of the business.  Disallowing PED use is probably just blocking the league from being more innovative.
 
The Other Side: The Miami Marlins
 
Every organization in baseball is a product of its ownership.  This is a simple fact that cannot be refuted or ignored.  Due to this, everything the Miami Marlins do is an extension of one Mr. Jeffrey Loria, an art dealer who purchased the team in the early 2000's.  Before I even get into what Loria has done to the Marlins' franchise, lets backtrack.  "Back in the day" Loria owned the Montreal Expos.  Because of the closeness Loria seems to share with bud Selig, Loria sold the franchise a property run by the 29 other clubs in the league (basically the commissioner's office), jumped ship, got a large no-interest loan from MLB, and then bought the Florida Marlins.  What did this do?  It created a death sentence for the Expos and led to their move to Washington (it also, as an extension, helped create the Boston Red Sox of the last 10 years).  This was considered by many to be terrible for the game.  Luckily for the game, the franchise has recovered well in Washington due to a great ownership group and deep talent throughout the front office and the rest of the organization.
 
However, that's only the first thing Loria did.  After taking advantage of my Cubs in 2003 and winning the World Series, Loria decided to save himself some cash by completely blowing up the team.  Now, there are fire sales and then there are what the Marlins have now done 3 times (post-97 and this year, which we'll get to shortly).  After gutting the roster to save a quick buck and completely disregarding any feelings the fan base had, Loria began working on his next move: getting a new park.  Now, the Marlins were in a pretty bad situation as they were playing in an awful park and couldn't draw fans.  Really, this was all Loria's fault.  He moved a franchise to a city that many thought would not support a baseball franchise (and oh my how those people were right).  Anyway, as any bad-market owner has always done, Loria sold Miami-Dade County on the fact that the team couldn't draw because of their ballpark.  For whatever reason, officials in the local government ignored the fact that this is frequently just an excuse by sports owners to save money by cutting expenses.  That's not even the worst of it, as the Marlins contributed only $155 million dollars to the $525 million project and net 100% of the profit.  That's right, Loria managed to convince people that he only needed to front 29.5% of the cost and can keep all of the profits.  Some may be thinking: so what?  A good businessman gets a great deal.  Well kind sirs and madams, the best part is yet to come:
 
After the plans to build the park were finalized, Loria decided to re-brand his product.  The Marlins, as many teams do, changed their name to reflect the institution that funded their stadium product and became the Miami Marlins.  Logo changes and color scheme changes followed, and the Marlins then went on a massive spending spree.  They signed several key free agents including Jose Reyes, Heath Bell, and Mark Buehrle.  The complete transition of the franchise to this money-spending mega product has proved to be nothing more than a ruse, however.  Fans didn't show up, the team performed miserably, and the public was made to believe that Loria and his financial forecasters did not actually expect this to happen.  As a result, the Marlins blew it all up roughly 12 months after completely re-branding the franchise.  Now, to help explain something, part of re-branding a sports team is changing the way you act.  You can put a $5,000 suit on a pile of garbage, but the fact is that it's still going to be a pile of garbage.  Nothing the Marlins changed in their re-branding really mattered.  They were still in a bad baseball market, they didn't make any significant front office changes, and they were still run by Loria.  After all of that money, all of those promises to fans, the Marlins didn't change anything.  The only thing that happened was that Loria made some money and got rid of all of the responsibility he burdened himself with.  The Marlins will now have a cheap roster, make bunches of money in TV revenues and ballpark revenues, and Loria will still be the same guy who screwed over Montreal in the late 90's and early 2000's.  Yet, by some miracle the other baseball owners continue to support Loria and he's still involved in the game.  Two franchises essentially left for dead (my money is that Loria will flip the team for profit in the near future, because that's just who he is) in 15 years of time in the league.
 
So back to the original question: what's worse for MLB?  In my opinion, the answer is the Miami Marlins.  The answer is Jeffrey Loria.  PED are just another phase in MLB that will pass and possibly come to be accepted as part of the game.  Loria, however, is going to continue to sap public funds, defraud the people that want to support his product, and constantly add more pain to this wound that has been his time in MLB. Sports ownership should be about promoting a brand, building a fan base, and winning titles.  Loria has shown time and time again that he's in it to make money.  This wouldn't be a problem if it were one of many goals like it is with most other MLB owners, but the evidence suggests that it's the only thing he's concerned about.  In my opinion, fans should be a lot more concerned that this individual is allowed to be in the league than whether or not their favorite players are trying their best to improve their performance and enhance the entertainment value of the game.

Sunday, January 20, 2013

Scott Boras: A Brief Review (Guest Post on Payoff Pitch Blog)


                Baseball, like all sports, is a game of winners and losers.  Individuals compete to see who is the best at performing particular tasks while utilizing their unique skill sets.  In baseball, one of the individuals who has changed this game the most has never set foot on a field as a MLB player, never worked with any organization, and didn’t work to invent any rules, make any equipment, or provide anything to change the game itself.  Instead, this individual worked with players and against MLB teams to forever change the baseball landscape.
 
                Scott Boras played in minor league baseball in the Cardinals and Cubs organizations.  While injuries cut his playing career short, Boras’ work in baseball had not yet really even begun.  After attending University of the Pacific to attain his Doctor of Pharmacy degree and eventually his law degree, Boras worked shortly for a pharmaceutical defense department of a Chicago law firm.  However, this was not the work that Boras was meant to perform.  Former players Mike Fischlin and Bill Caudill, both former teammates of Boras, hired the young lawyer as their agent which eventually landed Caudill a landmark $7.5 million contract.  At this point, Boras decided to move on from his other endeavors and pursue player representation full time.
 
                If there were a timeline marking the most significant events in the history of sports, the founding of the Boras Corporation would be one of the items bolded on the list.  To put it simply, Scott Boras founded what would become the greatest sports agency of all time.  What makes it the best agency of all time?  Let’s look at a list of some of the accomplishments achieved by Boras and his employees:
 
1988: Andy Benes signs for a $235,000 bonus as the first overall pick in the draft, the largest bonus given to a player in history at the time.
1989: Ben McDonald signs the first multi-year MLB contract ever given to a baseball only amateur.  His bonus was $350,000.
1990: Todd Van Poppel, the 14th overall pick, signs for $1.2 million with a $500,000 signing bonus, which is considered one of the most shocking and astonishing contract signings ever.
1992: Greg Maddux signs for 5 years and $28 million dollars, by far the largest contract in baseball history at the time.
1996: Jerry Reinsdorf (very close to commissioner Bud Selig) is “outsmarted” by Boras as the agent finds a loophole in the rules, allowing Bobby Seay to receive a $3 million signing bonus.  Maneuvers in this draft by Boras led to $25 million dollars extra for his clients and changing of MLB rules.
1997: The “Amateur Draft” is changed to “The First Year Player Draft” as Boras again finds loopholes in the rules to allow J.D. Drew to reject the Phillies’ offer, play independent baseball, and then sign for triple the amount the following year with the St. Louis Cardinals.
1997: Boras becomes the first agent to have a player break the $50 million barrier by signing Greg Maddux to a new deal with the Atlanta Braves.
1998: Boras gets a $87.5 million contract from the Yankees even after the club made public statements that they would not go above $60 million
2000: “The Contract that Changed Everything” is signed.  Alex Rodriguez signed a 10 year, $252 million contract with the Texas Rangers, which not only doubled the existing largest contract in sports, but was even more money than then-owner Tom Hicks had paid to buy the Rangers themselves.
2001: Andruw Jones receives $8.2 million in his 2nd year of salary arbitration.  This would stand as the largest salary arbitration win for any player until 2008.
2002: Again, Greg Maddux breaks a record, signing the largest one-year contract in baseball history ($14.75 million)
2004: Boras’ presence forces the Padres to pass on consensus top talents Stephen Drew and Jered Weaver because of financial concerns.  Instead they took Matt Bush, who never played above class A.  This would eventually lead to the change of using a shorter window to sign draft picks.
2006: Barry Zito signs record-breaking 7 year, $126 million contract with the Giants.
2007: Alex Rodriguez opts out of his initial contract and signs a deal with the potential to be worth $305 million dollars over 10 years after incentives.
2009: Boras signs Stephen Strasburg to the largest contract in draft history, worth $15.1 million.
2012: Prince Fielder surprises the entire baseball industry by signing a 9 year, $214 million contract with the Detroit Tigers.  The contract is considered one of Boras’ crowning achievements as many believed the market for Fielder to be thin at best.
 
                A good question to ask at this point would be simple: how?  How in the world is it possible for one agent so sign so many record-breaking contracts on so many different levels?  Well, part of it is that Scott Boras is one of the smartest individuals to ever appear in the world of baseball.  Boras stated it quite simply not terribly long ago:
 
“The economics of the game have never been better, which proves that investment in players, star players, is the way to go.  The fact is if an owner wants to win there are premium players out there.  And we know the revenues are there for them to pursue them.”
 
                A more direct way to say it would be: “I have what they want, so we do things on my terms.”  Since Boras has had such a massive stranglehold on top talent over the years, what alternatives are there for teams?  It’s not like you can say no to Boras, because eventually teams are going to give in to the desire to have talent and make money.  However, it may come across to some as odd, because not all of the above contracts were worth what they became.  This really reveals Boras’ go-to strategy: an incredible ability to oversell his players.  The best example of this comes in the 73-page binder that Boras developed for Prince Fielder heading into the 2011-2012 off season.  The book celebrated Prince Fielder’s achievements in the history of the game, which begs everyone to ask exactly what Fielder had achieved.  If you read between the lines, it really wasn’t a whole lot.  Don’t tell that to Scott Boras, because he eventually found a way to convince Tigers ownership that signing Fielder to $214 million was a worthwhile investment. 
 
                Now, not all of this is strictly because of Boras.  Boras just happened to be the most dominant agent during the largest period of growth for sports in American history.  With booming TV contracts, league expansion, and at some points a booming American economy, Boras and his clients walked into a gold mine.  But no, really, this was all about Scott Boras.  When you sign more than 15 record-breaking contracts, are the primary factor in three different significant rule changes, and completely change the entire landscape of player representation, you are going to go down as one of the most significant individuals in the history of sports.  Just forget baseball for a second and chew on this: Scott Boras might be one of the 10 most important non-players in the history of professional sports.  Perhaps the best way to present what Scott Boras has been to baseball?  Take a recent quote from Boras himself on the fact that his top-tier free agents are not yet signed:
 
                “People call me all the time and say, ‘Man, your players aren’t signed yet.’ Well, it doesn’t really matter what time dinner is when you’re the steak.” 
 
P.S.- Rafael Soriano, who many thought wouldn’t see a large contract because Boras waited so long to sign him, agreed to a multi-year deal with the Washington Nationals for $14 million dollars a season.  So really, the point here is that if Scott Boras represents a player, expect to pay up.