Trading for Ryan Dempster: Is it Worth It?

In a word: yes. However, since I'm not going to sit here and write a four-word blog entry, I'll go into more detail. To this point in the season, Ryan Dempster has been much better than in the past...if you look at him in the traditional sense. If you look at him in a more advanced way, he's been almost exactly the same pitcher for the past 4.5 seasons (if you notice, it dates back to the season in which he converted to being a starter).To get a look at his consistency, let's check out some rates:

 K/9, BB/9, HR/9, GB%:

 8.14, 3.31, 0.61, 48.1%
7.74, 2.93, 0.99, 47.2%
8.69, 3.59, 1.04, 47.4%
8.50, 3.65, 1.02, 44.1%
7.18, 2.34, 0.78, 42.1%

 What do all of those rates mean? Well, essentially they mean that Dempster has been a good-but-not-great starter in each of his past five seasons. Ignore the ERA, ignore the raw FIP, and especially ignore that W/L total. Check out the following fielding-independent numbers:

 tERA, SIERA, xFIP- (below 100 is good)

 3.94, 3.81, 85
4.14, 3.85, 88
4.02, 3.73, 94
4.51, 3.79, 96
4.49, 3.84, 95

 What do these rates mean? Well, they mean that Dempster hasn't been as good as we first thought. He's still been better than average, and he's still been incredibly consistent. However, those tERA numbers could suggest that he could blow up at any time (whenever a rate doesn't match others, you have to consider that it might be the correct one). Dempster hasn't seen any outrageous dips in other peripherals, either. His range of FB% is 31.8 to 36.9, and his range of HR/FB ratio is 7.7 to 11.3 (with the mean being much closer to 11 than 7). So really, anybody that trades for him knows what they're getting. Even at 35 years old, Dempster hasn't shown regression in his rates, so there really shouldn't be a reason to expect him to decline sharply (especially not in the next two months). Whoever trades for Dempster, be it the Dodgers (likely) or the Braves (longshot), is going to get an above-average pitcher who can go deep into games. There are concerns with Dempster, however. First of all, his most recent trip to the disabled list due to trouble with his lat (latissimus dorsi muscle) could be a sign that Dempster's body might not be capable of holding up deep into the playoffs. It is definitely not worth trading for Dempster if you can't rely on him to pitch into the postseason as a rental. This brings us into the discussion of trade philosophy. To start, we'll look at what incentive the Cubs have in trading him:

Cubs' Side:

Clearly President Theo Epstein and GM Jed Hoyer are in full rebuild mode. They have little incentive to keep 35 year-old veterans on the roster, and they have even less incentive to do so when those veterans have overperformed to increase their perceived value. In the past, the club could have always used the angle of holding the player and offering him arbitration as leverage in this situation, but that won't work. Instead of the old compensation rules, teams can't hold out for multiple draft picks for what would have been Type-A free agents. Rather, they have to offer the average salary of the 125 highest paid players in the game (and be denied by the player) to have a shot at compensation. Under this environment, that is almost 12.5 million dollars, and it would undoubtedly be accepted by Dempster. Therefore the Cubs will lose out on any potential value by failing to trade him at the deadline. Since other teams surely know this, it tips leverage more heavily in favor of teams trying to acquire Dempster.

Side of Trade Partner:

To put it simply: above-average starting pitchers are really, really rare. They are arguably the most valuable assets to an organization because of how difficult it is to replace them. While not in the tier of Zack Greinke and other mentioned trade chips this year, Dempster does fall under the umbrella of above-average starters. Going by what I mentioned earlier with sustained rates, a team trading for Dempster should expect just over a win of additional value over replacement level. With SP Nathan Eovaldi out of the picture in the Hanley Ramirez trade, the Dodgers have a hole in their rotation that they are apparently desperate to fill. But getting back to the original question, this isn't a matter of how much Dempster can produce; it's a matter of whether the deal is worth it to the Dodgers or not. For that, we look into a few factors.

1) Team Control

In trades, team control is one of the most important factors in claiming value. It is the biggest reason prospects are so highly valued, and it is why we hear about teams wanting to avoid "rental" players. As much as a year of control can take the value of a player like Josh Johnson and bump him into the upper echelon of starting pitchers on the market (regardless of performance). In this case, Ryan Dempster is a rental player with 10/5 rights. The 10/5 rights are relevant because they give a strong hint to where Dempster wants to play (since those rights give him the ability to block a trade to anyone). Dempster has the Dodgers at the top of his reported list, meaning that the Dodgers have a strong ability to sign him in the off season if desired. With some thought, this becomes a situation where it is important to ask whether this is really a rental to the Dodgers or rather if it is for multiple years of control with two extra months thrown in (since the Dodgers are spending a lot of cash and have shown so much interest in Dempster, they likely would sign him in free agency anyway).

2) Playoff Relevance

With team control handled, this scenario really becomes about value over two months for the Dodgers. In this modern age, 87 wins is the target number of wins in order to secure a spot in the post-season (down from the previous 89 wins). On top of that, the value of winning the wild card has severely decreased as the chances of winning the World Series from that spot have been severely decreased. Therefore more emphasis is placed on winning the division. In all honesty, this is where Dempster's value matters the most. The extra win of value expected from Dempster through the end of the season could very well serve as the difference between winning a division title and missing the playoffs entirely. Currently, the Dodgers and Giants are tied for the division lead, and adding Dempster could help widen the gap. If the Dodgers want to make a smart move to increase their playoff chances, they'll acquire someone like Dempster.

3) Prospects

The combination of need from the Dodgers and lack of leverage from the Cubs creates a very interesting scenario. In a normal circumstance, the Dodgers would be expected to win this trade by a wide margin (especially with Dempster's reported desire to be in LA). However, with the new ownership, LA's focus is clearly on improving the organization through being active in trades and free agency. With increased funds, the Dodgers can be aggressive in those facets of the game. This places less inherent organizational importance on prospects, meaning that the club could be more likely to part with them than in the past. When a team has great ability to attack in free agency and in trades, it has more flexibility with the movement of prospects.

Conclusion:

In this situation, Dempster can be had without overpayment. This makes his wins at the end of the season even more valuable, because they cost the organization less. This is why I think trading for Dempster is worth it. A week ago, when Dempster was nearly traded for Randall Delgado (a payment that was a massive overpayment in my eyes) I did not believe that trading for Dempster would be worth the price. Now a team like the Dodgers has one question to ask: is two months of Dempster and a possible division title worth more than good/decent prospects when we can easily replace those prospects through the resources we have as an organization? In my mind, the answer is yes, simply because of where the Dodgers are as an organization.

Breaking Down the Trade Deadline

As many of you know, the non-waiver trade deadline is one of the busiest times for baseball teams.  Clubs, even just a week prior to the deadline, are still unsure if they should truly be buyers or sellers.  Even if they've decided what they want to be, the approach to this year's deadline as undoubtedly changed.  This article from Vince Genarro, the President of SABR, breaks down the implications of a 2nd Wild Card.  Essentially, the article points how while it is easier for a team to make the playoffs, it is much harder for Wild Card teams to win in the post season.  This creates a much larger importance on winning one's division.  To this point, only one team has really made a significant move in attempting to attack a division crown: the Detroit Tigers. Their move for Anibal Sanchez and Omar Infante was a clear "win now" move, and it works well as an example of teams parting with top prospects to go for the division crown.  However, what about teams like Atlanta, Pittsburgh, and Oakland that are more likely to be wild card teams than division winners?  Well, by Gerrano's article, the odds are low for a wild card to win in the postseason (especially if that team is the 2nd wild card and has to play on the road).  In my mind, this creates quite the dilemma.  While these teams should try to improve to make the playoffs (after all, there is a zero percent chance of winning in the postseason if you don't make it), they risk being average next year if they trade for rental players that they might not be able to sign in the off season.  On top of it, traded players cannot lead to compensation picks in next year's draft.  This makes the situation especially tough for teams like the Athletics.  The reason?  Oakland is an upstart team with good, young players. However, is their production from guys like Josh Reddick and Tom Milone sustainable?  I doubt it, and Billy Beane probably will too.  Ultimately, the decision comes down to risking the future for a slim chance to win in the post season and appease the fans.  With that in mind, let's look at a few interesting teams as the deadline approaches.

Team One:  Milwaukee Brewers (44-51)
Games Back in Division: 11.5
Games Back in Wild Card: 8.0

The Brewers are really at what I consider to be the cutoff for buyers.  With a good week prior to the deadline, they could be as few as 5 games back in the WC race.  Two months is a lot of time to overcome a few teams while only having to make up 5 games.  However, since I'm much more of a realist, I'm calling the Brewers a seller.  They have a weak farm system, a bigtime expiring contract in Zack Greinke, and really would love to compete at some other point during Braun's long future tenure with the team.  In my opinion, the Brewers have a few players they can look at moving: Zack Greinke, Aramis Ramirez, and Kameron Loe.  Now, since Ramirez has 3 years left on his deal and Loe is a reliever, the only real trade piece the Brewers have is Zack Greinke.  Normally it would be an obvious decision to trade Greinke here, but there's one obstacle: the Brewers know they have a weak farm system and want to re-sign him.  This brings up the obvious question, "Is it worth more to re-sign him or to trade him?"  In my mind, the obvious choice is to re-sign him.  He and Braun are both 28 years old, and if either wants to compete in Milwaukee, they are very likely going to have to do it while playing with each other.  I understand that the Brewers have a dreadful farm, but let's not undermine the value of an ace.  Only six pitchers have more than 20 fWAR since 2009, which is an average of just under 6 fWAR per season.  Considering the average starter contributes about two wins for a ballclub, these pitchers are nearly three times as valuable as their average counterparts...and there are only six of them in a pool of over 150 starters.  If the Brewers can retain Greinke for a price at or near fair value, then they should.  Now, what if they *can't* do that?  Well, then the options are to trade him or offer him the average salary of the highest 125 players in the league and have him decline, which will lead to compensation picks.  In order to decide whether or not this is beneficial, we need to look at the two teams most likely to trade for him: the Texas Rangers and the Atlanta Braves.  If the Braves' trade for Dempster goes through, that leaves us with the Rangers.  The Rangers can offer 3B Mike Olt, SP Martin Perez, and Leonys Martin, which would probably be plenty for the Brewers.  Olt and Martin can contribute to the MLB club very soon, and Martin's upside makes him a great additional piece (for more analysis on these players, ask chimpape).  In my opinion, the options for Greinke and the Brewers break down like this:

1) Re-signed (preferably 5 years/$23 per year)
2) Traded to Texas, who has the deepest farm system and the most to win from trading for him
3) Comp picks

Team Two: Pittsburgh Pirates
Games Back in Division: 1.5
Games Back in WC: --

The Pirates are looking to avoid their 20th straight losing season, and it appears that they are in a great position to do so.  This makes their situation just a little bit different than other teams, because contention means fans and fans mean increases in revenue.  However, the Pirates have an even greater dilemma than what Milwaukee is facing.  While the chance to finish above .500 for the first time in 19 years is well within their grasp, they are a young team that has the chance to be very, very good in the future.  While they can make the postseason and increase their revenue, they also have to avoid being too aggressive and potentially missing out on the postseason.  This is going to sound dumb and cliche in many ways, but this really makes the most sensible player for them to acquire a younger player going into his prime who is under team control for a while.  AKA, the only significant player the Pirates can go after is Justin Upton, who is reportedly off of the trade market.  While Upton would have been a perfect fit for Pittsburgh, the inability to get him could be a blessing in disguise.  They will hold onto top prospects Gerrit Cole, Jameson Taillon, and Starling Marte and have them under team control for a long time.  If I were Neil Huntington, my strategy would be to trade lesser prospects for role players and depth.  This improves the roster while giving up few prospects.  The chances of making the postseason (bigger for the Pirates than just about any other club) are increased and the long-term future is not put at risk.  As I am typing this, it is being reported that they are close to landing Wandy Rodriguez.  This would be an addition that matches the suggested strategy perfectly.  The Pirates should remain quiet at the deadline and keep their young players within the organization.  It's not worth giving them up to make the post season and be eliminated early.

Team Three: Tampa Bay Rays
Games Back in Division: 9
Games Back in WC: 2.5

The Rays are an interesting team because they are rumored to be contemplating trading away SP James Shields.  For a team that is so close to the post season, they are a perfect example of why this trade deadline is so screwy.  The AL WC race is so tight and ridiculous that the Rays really have no idea whether they are solid contenders.  Even if they did win the WC, can they consider themselves a good candidate to win a play-in game and then beat Texas or New York?  Probably not, considering that first WC team is currently Los Angeles.  From a financial standpoint, it makes much more sense for Tampa Bay to trade Shields than to keep him (the key point I haven't mentioned yet is that Shields is a free agent after the season and Tampa doesn't have a relative prayer at signing him).  What makes this even more interesting is that the trade status of ace pitchers Zack Greinke and Cole Hamels is unknown.  Because of that, it's possible that Shields could be either the best pitcher on the market or the third best pitcher on the market.  This could definitely change his perceived value as next Tuesday's deadline approaches.  The Rays are going to be sellers (they could be neutral, but I think that would be wasted opportunity).  Under the old system, I don't think there's a chance they would be sellers, considering they would be only 3 games out of the WC and getting into the playoffs means a one-in-eight chance of winning the World Series.  That's what makes the Rays interesting, and it is why I chose to briefly mention them.

Team Four: Oakland Athletics
Games Back in Division: 6
Games Back in WC: --

The Athletics are a combination of everyone listed above.  They could really be helped by making the postseason (pads the resume for a stadium deal/relocation effort), they have good young players that they really shouldn't move, and they don't really have the finances to sign someone long term.  Therefore, they need someone who can come at a reasonable price, has a potential high ceiling, and can be under contract for a while.  AKA, they need to target Hanley Ramirez, which is exactly what they are doing.  Is there a better place to put a guy with character issues than Oakland?  I don't think so.  Pressure isn't high, stays out of the eye of the national media, and he'll be guaranteed the starting shortstop spot unless Beane tells him he can't have it (due to no competition at the position).  The only hangup here could be that Hanley's contract is big for someone who is producing as little as he is (nearly 16 million each of the next two years and about 7 million left on his contract for this year).  That creates a spike in Oakland's payroll.  If they could get Miami to eat a portion of the contract and avoid parting with their absolute best prospects, I think this is a move they really need to make.  I also think it is a very plausible scenario, seeing as Miami reportedly considered moving Hanley in the off season as he didn't want to play third base.  However, if that can't be done, the A's should just try to ride their hot streak/luck and hope to steal away the 2nd Wild Card (or win the first one).  They are very likely not going to win the division ahead of Texas and LA, and the chances of winning from a WC spot are less than they have been in previous post seasons.  Even though they could really benefit from the revenue, I don't think the A's are in a position to be major players at the deadline.

So there are a few teams to keep an eye on over the next week.  All four represent different scenarios, and all will likely have very different approaches to the deadline.  To sum up in a few points:

1) Winning the World Series from a WC spot this year is an incredible longshot.  The only team to have real success out of a play-in experience was Colorado in 2007, but that has to be taken with a grain of salt since they were on what was arguably the greatest late-season run in history.
2) Rental players can't bring compensation, so trading for players that aren't under contract is a mistake for young teams who could become serious contenders by moving their young prospects.
3) Teams that could compete and win the WC spots won't inherently be buyers.  They have to more strongly consider their moves at the deadline this year.  Making a move for a player and being unable to bring him back could very well lead to them being average the next year with fewer prospects to play with.  Even though that part hasn't changed from the past, there is less reward for winning a WC spot, so this could potentially be a turnoff.  How we determine buyers and sellers will be much more complex than it has been in the past.
 
P.S.- Pirates traded Robbie Grossman for Wandy Rodriguez.  Perfect move for a team like them at the deadline.

Looking at the 2012 Draft: A Strategic Approach

If you pay close attention to baseball’s annual amateur draft, then you are probably aware of the dynamic changes that have occurred in draft strategy over the years.  Under the old system, teams would get plenty of compensation picks and had no restrictions on how much they could spend.  Eventually, a few teams (particularly the Toronto Blue Jays) figured out a way to expose this draft environment and get a leg up on other teams.  Rather than shell out cash in free agency on Type A and Type B free agents (resulting in a loss of picks), teams held their cash on the open market and saved if for the draft.  Now, before I get to the next point, there’s a key piece of information I need to introduce you to:

Amateur baseball players have been notorious in the past for holding out for the maximum amount of money.  This especially goes for any player that has not reached their senior year of college.  This creates what is referred to in the industry as “signability concerns.”  If a team doesn’t want to pay the player over the suggested slot value, then the team missed out on that player and could pick at the same spot again in the next season’s draft (under the old system). 

What teams like the Blue Jays eventually figured out was that they could actually target these players and spend big in the draft, which would ensure that they could receive maximum value for their picks in the draft.  This led to farm systems that were absolutely stacked within a period of a few years (teams like the Blue Jays and Rangers are consistently ranked among the best farm systems, and this draft strategy is why).

Well, here comes the bad news: the new MLB CBA that was agreed to this past winter completely killed this draft strategy.  Rather than just have suggested slot values, teams had to start dealing with *actual* slot values.  Going overslot results in a luxury tax, and going 5% or more over slot value results in the loss of a draft pick the following year.  This completely changed the game, because teams could no longer wait for players with signability concerns to fall to them.  Doing so would result in the loss of future picks, which makes the old strategy worthless because you can no longer spend in the draft to stack the farm.  This was rather unfortunate, because while MLB likely put the new system in place to protect small market teams, it can easily be argued that the new system really hurts small market teams.  With fewer players leading to comp picks, teams like Tampa Bay can no longer stockpile picks and then spend overslot to get them. 

Baseball has never been a game where individuals and teams just sit around and wait for things to happen.  A new strategy would have to be formed in order for teams to stay ahead of the curve.  With a new complex system, teams had roughly six months to figure it out before the draft.  On top of it all, a shorter signing period window gave them even less time to negotiate deals.  With the signing deadline now behind us, we can look at a few teams and see how they played the draft.  I have six teams with interesting strategies, although several of them feed into one overlying strategy that will become obvious as we go through them.  With that, let’s look at our first team, who had what some people could call a disappointing draft:

Team 1: Pittsburgh Pirates

Total Number of Picks in First 10 Rounds: 11

Number of picks signed to date: 7

Primary strategy: College Players

With the 8^th overall pick in this June’s draft, the Pirates make what is going to be played as the ballsiest move in the draft.  Some people will label their selection of Stanford RHP Mark Appel as a mistake in philosophy and logic, but that is not how I view the case.  Prior to the draft, Appel was projected as a top 3 pick (for a long time he was the projected #1 overall pick).  This meant that he was projected to be slotted anywhere from 7.2 million dollars to 5.2 million dollars (72% of the #1 overall slot).  On draft day, he and his agent Scott Boras watched as Appel slipped all the way to #8.  This spot carried with it a 2.9 million dollar slot bonus, which was 40% of the #1 overall slot and 56% of the #3 overall slot.  Immediately after the draft in his first interview, Appel talked of his desire to finish his degree and how much he liked Stanford.  Both were not good signs for the Pirates, and sure enough Appel did not sign by the deadline and will head back to Stanford for his final year. 

Going back in time a little bit, the Pirates had to have known on draft day that the chances of signing Appel were small.  Therefore, they would likely take other players who would ask for overslot payments earlier in the draft to give themselves shots at obtaining solid talent.  Well, in the supplemental round, the Pirates took another college player.  In fact, the Pirates would wind up choosing eight college players in their first 11 picks.  After the signing period ended, the Pirates had signed their three high school selections in rounds two, three, and eight, but failed to sign four of the college players they selected (disclaimer: college senior did not need to sign by the initial draft signing deadline). The Pirates lost their first and fourth round selections.  How could this happen?  Well, they took players they had little leverage over, which was especially the case for Appel.  Under the new CBA, players with signability concerns who fall and still have years of collegiate eligibility left will have very, very little reason to sign with a pro team.  After losing out on his projected slot bonus, Mark Appel would have had no real reason to sign with Pittsburgh unless he felt that: 1) Next year’s draft class was better and he would fall again or 2) He would be injured in his senior season at Stanford.   After seeing what Pittsburgh failed to do with their draft, we move onto a team with a similar draft strategy that executed it much better.

Team 2: Minnesota Twins

Total Number of Picks in First 10 Rounds: 13

Number of picks signed to date: 11

Primary strategy: College Players

The Twins and Pirates had very similar draft strategies.  They took college players early and often.  The Twins, however, performed the strategy much better than Pittsburgh.  With the second overall pick, the Twins selected OF Byron Buxton who was a high school player from Georgia.  With 6.2 million dollars in slot bonus to play around with, the Twins were able to sign Buxton *under* is projected slot value.  Had they signed Mark Appel, they likely would have gotten a player with a lower ceiling who wanted more money (undoubtedly Appel would have asked for above the suggested slot value at the #2 spot).  By signing Buxton under the slot value, they were able to select three quality players with their three first round supplemental picks and agreed to contracts with them all.  Knowing this, the Twins took their second pair of high school players in rounds six and seven.  The way the system works, teams get a pool of money to spend on their picks in the top ten rounds.  This means they could give it all to one player or spend it evenly on all of their players.  With the extra money from Buxton’s agreement, the Twins were able to up their offers to their supplemental picks while creating the ability to take more risks towards the bottom of the round.  While they eventually could not agree with their sixth round pick, the Twins got their top eight picks with little worry about losing any of them.  If they eventually sign their 9^th round pick (a college senior), then they will have had a great draft with how they distributed their bonus pool.

Team 3: San Diego Padres

Total Number of Picks in First 10 Rounds: 14

Number of picks signed to date: 14

Primary strategy: College Players

The Padres and their “sister team” (just a phrase I’m going to use for teams with similar strategies) the Astros played the draft extremely well.  The one trend you’ll find from the Padres and the three teams that follow is that everyone signs (except for one college senior with Houston, who will likely sign).  The Padres had three supplemental picks paired with their first round pick, and they spent three of those selections on high school players.  As you have probably already noticed, the Padres signed *every single one* of their draft picks between rounds one and ten.  By taking high ceiling players early and multiple college seniors between rounds two and ten, the Padres were able to distribute their money very evenly.  While I could explain it now, I’ll wait and explain the college senior strategy when we get to our final team (the team that played the draft system the best).  Since the Padres have a very similar strategy to their sister team, I’ll move on to that team now.

Team 4: Houston Astros

Total Number of Picks in First 10 Rounds: 11

Number of picks signed to date: 10

Primary strategy: College Players

There was much praise for the Astros following their draft.  They took several high ceiling players early and signed them all.  With the first overall pick, the Astros grabbed SS Carlos Correa, who some scouts think reminds them of a young Alex Rodriguez.  Hold on…a young A-Rod going first overall who has all of his college eligibility left certainly would demand a ton, right?  Wrong.  Correa, much like the #2 overall pick Byron Buxton, signed underslot.  The Astros then spent their only supplemental first round pick on HS right hander Lance McCullers, who was believed to be headed to college with little hope of signing.  The Astros went way over the slot value for McCullers (in fact, they doubled it with their agreement) and signed the right hander away from his commitment to the University of Florida.  The Astros would go on to take high schoolers in rounds four and six and were able to also use a similar strategy to lure them away from their college commitments.  They spent a value nearly exactly equal to their bonus pool and will walk away with a minimum of 10 of their first 11 picks while almost doubling up on their agreement with McCullers.  Next, we’re going to move onto two teams who played the draft very well by signing high ceiling HS players early and multiple college players late.

Team 5: Chicago Cubs

Total Number of Picks in First 10 Rounds: 12

Number of picks signed to date: 12

Primary strategy: High School Players

The new regime in Chicago made it known publicly that they were not big fans of the changed draft rules.  As one of the biggest exploiters of the old draft system, Theo Epstein had to quickly change gears to figure out how to best attack the draft.  After looking at what the Cubs did, it’s obvious that they picked up on it quickly.  The Cubs selected five high school players with their first seven picks, and not once did they really have apparent worries about being unable to sign a player.  While negotiating with first round pick Albert Almora and his agent Scott Boras took a while, the Cubs spent just under their bonus pool and agreed to all of their picks in the top ten rounds.  Their sister team, the Toronto Blue Jays, took things a step further and played the draft as perfectly as anyone can play it.  Rather than talk about my own team more, I want to talk about the Blue Jays and just how well they executed this draft.

Team 6: Toronto Blue Jays

Total Number of Picks in First 10 Rounds: 14

Number of picks signed to date: 14

Primary strategy: High School Players

If you want to see the beauty in the execution of the business theory surrounding baseball operations, look no further than Toronto.  They seemingly do everything well: they trade for low-risk, high-reward players like Jose Bautista, Edwin Encarnacion, and Colby Rasmus (and then extend them for well below market value).  Then they move poor contracts like Vernon Wells for whatever anyone is willing to give them.  Along with that, they limit themselves to contracts of a maximum five years as to not suffer long-term burns.  To put the icing on the cake, they go out and own the draft as they consistently have top ranked drafts and top ranked farm systems.  This year was absolutely no different.  With two first round picks and three first round supplemental picks, the Blue Jays found themselves with 14 picks in the top 10 rounds and five picks in the first 60 (so they were picking once every 12 players, essentially).  Six of their first seven picks were high school players and their final seven players were all college players (the majority of them seniors).  Now I will explain why this strategy is so genius:

When a college senior decides to enter the draft, he is committing to the next part of his life.  There is no college eligibility left, and the only alternative to signing with a team is playing in an independent or international league.  Therefore, he lacks the one thing that players with signability concerns have a ton of: leverage.  By picking college seniors with the lower picks in the draft, the team can propose a value at or under slot.  When the player is approached with this offer, he has very little incentive to decline the offer.  Therefore he is likely to accept and more money from the bonus pool is left over to dish out to players with signability concerns.

The Blue Jays took the above strategy and ran with it.  With their six months to figure everything out, they scouted the necessary players (they have a monstrous scouting department and more regional scouts than any other team) and signed every single player they made an offer to.  They agreed with all of their college seniors and all of their super high-ceiling high school players.  If there is a team that had a best draft, it is very likely Toronto (especially if you are focusing on team strategy).

With all of these teams analyzed, it should be pretty clear what mistakes were made by teams like Pittsburgh.  When you don’t create enough leverage for yourself lower in the draft, you lose the ability to sign your top players.  Now, in the case of Pittsburgh, they would have had to take college seniors with almost all of their picks in order to sign Appel, and it’s simply not worth the loss in high-ceiling players to meet his demands.  In the future, expect a lot of teams to follow the precedent set by Alex Anthopolous and Theo Epstein.  You should also expect even fewer high school players to sign if they get picked much below the 3^rd round.  There are not going to be any more Dillon Maples 14^th round signings that go for multiple millions in signing bonuses.  As unfortunate as it is, this is going to have to be how teams play the draft for now.  It’s the easiest way to beat a system that just shouldn’t exist in the first place.