Mark your calendars, folks! Friday, March 29th, 2013 will probably go down as one of the more memorable days in contract history (not that anyone actually remembers the specific days when contracts are signed). Three different extensions were handed out today to three very different and very deserving players. The Diamondbacks locked up Paul "Goldy" Goldschmidt, the Tigers made Justin Verlander a 200 million dollar man, and Buster Posey doubled up on an old-ish record. Let's dive right in:
Paul Goldschmidt
Deal: 5 years/ $32 million, option for $14.5 million
This goes down as the least surprising deal of the day. It has been reported throughout the off season that extending Goldy was right at the top of the Diamondbacks' wish list. Goldschmidt is starting to emerge as one of the best young hitters in the game, and it's clear that the D-Backs hold the opinion that there is certainly room to improve. Whether you like fWAR or rWAR, it's probably safe to say the Goldy put up three wins in value last year. On the free agent market (remember, I use a 5.2 d/WAR model) this performance is worth ~$15.6 million AAV. In terms of extension talk (remember, the hole point of an extension is to use the lack of leverage against a player in negotiations to sign a deal for *less* than the free agent market would bear), this performance would probably be worth something along the lines of $12-$13 AAV (I'm not sold on any extension model yet, but I like the low-4's for now).
Now let's get to the projection section. Clearly, Goldschmidt does not lack power. With a swing conducive to power production (both heavy line drive numbers and home run numbers), I think it's also a bit safe to say that Goldschmidt should be a lock for some consistent offensive production. He got his strikeout rate well down from 2011 and kept it at 22%, which can be worked with. He also walks 10% of the time, and his ISO has been steadily over .200 over 764 PA in his young career. This basis suggests consistent development, so I'll go with a projection that looks like this (Goldy is also an adequate defender and is decent on the bases):
2014 (25): 4.5 WAR (extension starts in 2014)
2015 (26): 5.0 WAR
2016 (37): 5.3 WAR
2017 (28): 5.5 WAR
2018 (29): 5.3 WAR
2019 (30): 5.3 WAR (option year)
Again, I try to be favorable to players and give them the benefit of the doubt. Rapid development into his prime and a solid plateau through his prime years. This model suggests 30.9 wins in six years, which is about $132.87 million over those six years if we assume an extension ratio of 4.3 d/WAR. Now, here's something new I'm going to throw in...it's easy to look at $32 million vs. $132,87 million and say "well that's a no brainer for the D-Backs if they are right about his development." However, the $32 million number doesn't factor in what the player would have made without the contract. Goldschmidt was scheduled to start arbitration after the 2014 season, and he would have gotten a significant chunk of change. Just to take a guess (as arbitration numbers can be odd and variant), here's what his arbitration numbers may have looked like:
2014: 750k
2015: 4 million
2016: 7 million
2017: 11 million
2018 (FA): 20 million (I think it's safe to say that 20 million is pretty conservative for a 4.8 win player in 2018)
2019 (FA): 25 million (sweet goodness)
That total is about $67.75 million, which is considerably more than the deal the D-Backs gave Goldschmidt. The deal gives Goldy a guaranteed $32 million with a 2019 club option for 2019 that would be $14.5 million, bringing the total to 46.5 million over 6 years, or an AAV of 7.75 million (and remember, the deal doesn't cover 2013, where the D-Backs will be paying Goldschmidt scraps as a pre-arb player).
All in all, a fantastic get for the D-Backs, especially after reports that Goldy had turned them down earlier in the off season.
Justin Verlander
Deal: 5 years/$140 million (w/2020 option for $22 million)
This deal is a big one. When you add on the two years Verlander was already under contract, the hurler can reach a total of $202 million over the next 8 seasons, which makes him the first $200 million pitcher in history. All in all, I'm not concerned about the next two years' commitments as they were already guaranteed to happen. The deal adds $162 million in potential new money to his contract (still making him the highest paid pitcher in history). Using an extension model, this deal assumes Verlander produces 37.7 wins IF his option vests (and it does so if he finishes top 5 in Cy Young voting in 2019). The question is: can he get there? My answer is "probably" in this scenario. Why? Well, the deal starts with Verlander's age 32 season (aka, two years down the road in 2015). Here's a predictive model:
2015 (32): 6.4 WAR
2016 (33): 6.1 WAR
2017 (34): 5.8 WAR
2018 (35): 5.5 WAR
2019 (36): 4.8 WAR
2020 (37): 3.5 WAR
This model is pretty conservative, because it has to be (sorry, pitchers). While I favor the argument that he is a horse with strong mechanics and a strong body/work ethic, I also thought the same thing about Roy Halladay. Well, I think it's obvious that Roy Halladay hit a wall last year in his age 35 season. I understand that Verlander is strong, but 240+ innings is a ton for any pitcher these days. That's what concerns me the most. Anyway, this model still predicts Verlander to create 32.1 wins over the course of this added money. While not quite what the contract demands, there are other factors in play here. Firstly, other pitchers are breaking contract records left and right. By the time Verlander hit free agency in 2015, we probably would have seen the first $300 million dollar player (eyeing you, Clayton Kershaw), which means the going rate for Verlander on the open market would have been HUGE. This alone destroys the validity of the 4.3 d/WAR extension model, and it probably also throttles the 5.2 d/WAR model for free agency. Using the 5.2 d/WAR model, Verlander only has to produce 31.2 wins, which means that the Tigers still got Verlander for juuuuuuust under current market value (but as I said, that model will be destroyed at this pace).
Overall, the money in this deal is fair. Roy Halladay may have hit a wall at age 35, but he produced some of his greatest seasons in his early 30's. This gives me hope that Verlander can do the same, and the Tigers aren't locked into that 2020 option if Verlander does fall off. Considering the way the pitching market is developing, this is probably also a pretty strong contract. It was also probably wise to get this deal done now instead of waiting until after the Dodgers attack Kershaw.
Buster Posey
Deal: 8 years/$159 million (9 years/$167 million if you include 2013 salary) + 2022 option for $22 million
Oh boy, this one is huge. For reference, Carlos Gonzalez and the Rockies set the record for total dollars given to a player with less than three years of experience at $80 million back before the 2011 season. This deal almost DOUBLES that record! As a Super 2, Buster Posey is already in arbitration, with a scheduled 2013 salary of $8 million. Posey turned 26 two days ago, and he was scheduled for free agency in 2017. This contract covers those arbitration years and the first few years of his free agent eligibility, as well as giving him full no-trade rights. Unlike the other deals, the breakdown was reported with this one:
2013 (26): $8 million (already scheduled, not new to the deal)
2014 (27): $10.5 million
2015 (28): $16.5 million
2016 (29): $20 million
2017 (30): $21.4 million
2018 (31): $21.4 million
2019 (32): $21.4 million
2020 (33): $21.4 million
2021 (34): $21.4 million
2022 (35): $22 million (option, $3 million buyout)
As expected, this contract is a beautiful example of deferring money to later years. The deal is strikingly similar to Joe Mauer's extension from 2011, and it actually pays less money, even though it is over about the same age range that Mauer's deal is (28-35 for Mauer vs .27-35 for Posey). Granted, Posey was further from free agency than Mauer (and Mauer was far more established within the Majors), but the deal is still great. Using the 4.3 d/WAR extension model, the total over 9 years (if we count the extension) calls for Posey to create 38.8 wins in value. I really don't want to get into projection value for a catcher long-term, but if I had to, I'd go with something like this:
2013 (26): 6.0
2014 (27): 6.3
2015 (28): 6.0
2016 (29): 5.7
2017 (30): 5.5
2018 (31): 5.2
2019 (32): 4.8
2020 (33): 4.3
2021 (34): 4.0
2022 (35): 3.7
If you're wondering why the value numbers aren't being projected upward into Posey's prime, it's because I'm automatically assuming that he is going to get less and less time behind the plate as his career goes on. It's no secret that playing catcher requires a lot of stamina and durability, and with a contract this large, the Giants will want to limit risk as much as possible. Posey already was down to 114 games caught in 2012, and I don't anticipate that number going anywhere but south in the near future. The Twins have done the same thing with Joe Mauer, and I feel that both players will be treated the same way. Now, this all being said, that's 51.5 wins in value over 10 years, which is a solid 5.15 WAR/year clip. This kind of production mandates an average AAV of $22.145 million using the 4.3 d/WAR model, so it looks like the Giants just about nailed this one right on the head. Given the fact that Posey is sitting alone atop his position right now, this deal looks like a fantastic get along the lines of the deals given to Ryan Braun and Troy Tulowitzki.
All in all, this is a great contract. Let's just hope Scott Cousins isn't going to try to run him over in the near future.
Lasting Thought
We are seeing more of the same in these extensions. Arbitration is going to be dead as a process very soon, if it isn't already considered legally dead within MLB. Teams and players just don't want to deal with the process. It's also clear with the extensions given to Felix and Verlander that teams aren't about to play the free agency game with their top players any more. The new television contracts are bringing in a new element to free agency: more teams capable of paying out massive contracts. This is even bringing loaded owners like Mike Ilitch to lock up their players before they hit the market, even if the contracts are basically being handed out at projected current market value.
Down the road, there are two key players that will mean a lot to the future understanding of how teams will approach new deals: Clayton Kershaw and Robinson Cano. With he money the Dodgers have, it would not surprise me if Kershaw (25 years old) became the first $300 million man in baseball. A deal totaling 10 years and $300 million isn't out of the question, given that he's scheduled to make $11 million in 2013 as it is, and it's pretty much a given that the Dodgers won't let him get to the open market. With Cano, it seems he and Scott Boras are intent on making him the next big free agent signing in MLB. In the modern landscape, his status as a superstar at a thin position hitting the market at a reasonable age is incredibly rare. There is no doubt in my mind that Boras and his staff will use this as incredible leverage, and it's likely that there won't be a shortage of teams seeking Cano's services.
At the end of the day, the MLB landscape is changing, and it's changing quickly. Teams are countering the inflated revenues due to TV deals by simply not allowing their players to hit free agency in their primes (another example: the Cardinals extended Adam Wainwright for nearly $100 million this week). We'll have to see what the next CBA does about this, but for now: enjoy it. We are living in the golden age of professional baseball, IMO.
Friday, March 29, 2013
Sunday, March 24, 2013
Yuniesky Betancourt: Finally Done?
Today the Phillies released Yuniesky Betancourt, and with less than a week left in spring training it appears likely that "Yuni B" will not be breaking camp as a regular contributor with a club. The first question that comes to my mind is, "Why in the world has it taken this long?" Betancourt's career has been defined by swinging at bad pitches and misplaying routine balls on defense. Yet year after year, he was handed a starting job. Year after year, negative rWAR performance after negative rWAR performance, he started. Last year, the Royals wouldn't give him a chance at short, but they let him play at second. By August, he was released. The Phillies brought him in this year to give him a shot to make the club, but it appears that Yuni B is finally out of options. Finally, it appears that MLB has reached a collective state where it has determined that Yuni B is done as a significant contributor.
Career Summary
To keep this short, I'll skip the finer details of Betancourt's career. The Seattle Mariners signed him as an amateur free agent in 2005 as a defector out of Cuba. In his first few years, Betancourt was actually pretty serviceable. While he never obtained the status of "Major League average player" in his career, he did have some value early on. At the trade deadline in 2009, the Kansas City Royals traded for Yuni B to have him as their primary shortstop. By this time, Betancourt's defense had severely dwindled and he was frequently unable to contribute positive value in any facet of his game. In December of 2010, he was part of the trade that sent Zack Greinke to Milwaukee. After another disappointing season up in the Beer City, Yuni B was granted free agency, and he eventually signed with the Royals. After contributing -1.2 rWAR and -0.8 fWAR, he was given his outright release and did not appear in the majors after that point.
Tools
Looking back on Betancourt's career, it's really hard to see how teams justified bringing Yuni B on as a player, let alone as a starter. When you watch him on tape and look over his numbers, he just doesn't seem to have any redeeming qualities. To get what I mean, let's go over some traditional scouting tools:
1) Hit tool: Betancourt has always been a free swinger who rarely strikes out. He's able to make contact, but he just doesn't do anything with it. He has a career LD% of 18.2 and only missed pitches he swung at 6.2% of the time. The line drive percentage is tied for 131st among qualifying 2012 batters, and the swing-and-miss rate would have been tied for 35th best. So overall, really not that good.
2) Power tool: Career ISO of .126 and HR/FB rate of 5.0. Even though he played quite a bit of his career in Safeco and Kaufman, these numbers are still exceptionally low for a guy who showed up in a pretty favorable offensive era. His HR/FB rate would have been 130th best in MLB among 2012 qualified batters and the ISO would have been 115th (and remember, we are currently in a pitcher-friendly offensive environment).
3) Speed: Betancourt was never a speed guy, and he was 30/60 on stolen base attempts in his career, which is atrocious. 75% is often considered the cutoff for being valuable, and Yuni B was well off of that mark. As far as his other baserunning tools, his career BsR is -5.3.
4) Fielding: Career UZR of -56, career dWAR of -3.1, and a career marked by laughable efforts in the field. Overall, he's been a terrible fielder.
5) Arm strength: This is one thing I'm not sure you can hold against Yuni B. He's always had an adequate throwing arm, and he's made his fair share of great throws in his career. You can be the judge.
Lasting Impact
I think it's safe to say that it is remarkable that Yuniesky Betancourt lasted as long as he did in the Major Leagues. Without any real redeemable MLB qualities, Betancourt kept getting starts. I guess what is most mystifying about Yuni B's career is the fact that he did it all in the "Information Age" of baseball. With all of the emphasis on advanced scouting video, detailed reports, and statistical analysis, it just surprises me that teams kept concluding that he was worth a shot. Even his release came as a surprise to me, given the fact that the Phillies also have employed Michael Young and Delmon Young this spring. Either way, the Phillies made the right choice. It's time for Yuni B to walk off into the sunset and enjoy his life.
But who knows, teams are reportedly interested in signing him. Perhaps he's still got some starts left in his system.
Career Summary
To keep this short, I'll skip the finer details of Betancourt's career. The Seattle Mariners signed him as an amateur free agent in 2005 as a defector out of Cuba. In his first few years, Betancourt was actually pretty serviceable. While he never obtained the status of "Major League average player" in his career, he did have some value early on. At the trade deadline in 2009, the Kansas City Royals traded for Yuni B to have him as their primary shortstop. By this time, Betancourt's defense had severely dwindled and he was frequently unable to contribute positive value in any facet of his game. In December of 2010, he was part of the trade that sent Zack Greinke to Milwaukee. After another disappointing season up in the Beer City, Yuni B was granted free agency, and he eventually signed with the Royals. After contributing -1.2 rWAR and -0.8 fWAR, he was given his outright release and did not appear in the majors after that point.
Tools
Looking back on Betancourt's career, it's really hard to see how teams justified bringing Yuni B on as a player, let alone as a starter. When you watch him on tape and look over his numbers, he just doesn't seem to have any redeeming qualities. To get what I mean, let's go over some traditional scouting tools:
1) Hit tool: Betancourt has always been a free swinger who rarely strikes out. He's able to make contact, but he just doesn't do anything with it. He has a career LD% of 18.2 and only missed pitches he swung at 6.2% of the time. The line drive percentage is tied for 131st among qualifying 2012 batters, and the swing-and-miss rate would have been tied for 35th best. So overall, really not that good.
2) Power tool: Career ISO of .126 and HR/FB rate of 5.0. Even though he played quite a bit of his career in Safeco and Kaufman, these numbers are still exceptionally low for a guy who showed up in a pretty favorable offensive era. His HR/FB rate would have been 130th best in MLB among 2012 qualified batters and the ISO would have been 115th (and remember, we are currently in a pitcher-friendly offensive environment).
3) Speed: Betancourt was never a speed guy, and he was 30/60 on stolen base attempts in his career, which is atrocious. 75% is often considered the cutoff for being valuable, and Yuni B was well off of that mark. As far as his other baserunning tools, his career BsR is -5.3.
4) Fielding: Career UZR of -56, career dWAR of -3.1, and a career marked by laughable efforts in the field. Overall, he's been a terrible fielder.
5) Arm strength: This is one thing I'm not sure you can hold against Yuni B. He's always had an adequate throwing arm, and he's made his fair share of great throws in his career. You can be the judge.
Lasting Impact
I think it's safe to say that it is remarkable that Yuniesky Betancourt lasted as long as he did in the Major Leagues. Without any real redeemable MLB qualities, Betancourt kept getting starts. I guess what is most mystifying about Yuni B's career is the fact that he did it all in the "Information Age" of baseball. With all of the emphasis on advanced scouting video, detailed reports, and statistical analysis, it just surprises me that teams kept concluding that he was worth a shot. Even his release came as a surprise to me, given the fact that the Phillies also have employed Michael Young and Delmon Young this spring. Either way, the Phillies made the right choice. It's time for Yuni B to walk off into the sunset and enjoy his life.
But who knows, teams are reportedly interested in signing him. Perhaps he's still got some starts left in his system.
Is Scott Boras Losing His Edge?
I've made it clear in posts in the past that I think Scott Boras has been great for the game of baseball. I think he's one of the primary reasons that teams took the "Moneyball" approach to operations. When faced with his intimidating tactics and ludicrous demands for his clients, teams took to avenues that would help them field winning ball clubs without utilizing the services of those players. However, at some point, the market HAD to shift away from this dynamic. I don't think anyone is naive enough to think that this relationship between Boras and MLB's top executives would always exist as it had for many years. This change appears to have occurred right before our very eyes in this off season.
To set the stage, Boras came into the off season with a few major clients: SP Kyle Lohse, CF Michael Bourn, RP Rafael Soriano, and RP Ryan Madson (who will not be discussed in this post). One would think that due to the 2012 performances of the first three players, Boras would be stuffing a nice wad of money into his bank account after the off season. While he's still stuffing a much larger wad into his account than I am, it's a lot smaller than what it could have been (and I mean a LOT smaller). Let's go case-by-case here, starting with the biggest disaster of them all:
SP Kyle Lohse
I hold this truth to be self-evident: Kyle Lohse is a lot better than a lot of the starters that will be on MLB's 30 rosters come April 1st. I wrote about the fact that he's still not signed here. Today, it was reported on Twitter that Boras is still seeking the same $14-$15 million AAV that teams have been scoffing at for Lohse. I really appreciate persistence and drive to succeed at your job, but there comes a point where you're stuck between a rock and a hard place and need to just give it up. Even teams with protected picks don't appear to be comfortable in signing Lohse to a short-term deal at the price range Boras is seeking. Boras isn't just playing hardball on this one; he's playing diamond ball. Let's forget the compensation issue for a second and ask ourselves, "Would Lohse be overpaid even if he wasn't attached to the loss of a draft pick?" Well, here's a line I'm stealing from my own blog post:
"Knowing Boras and the fact that Edwin Jackson brought in 13 million dollars a season, I would imagine Lohse is looking for something like 4 years, 56 million. Based on my model, this would be an overpayment of about 7 million dollars by the signing team. "
So yes, Boras is looking for a nice overpayment with compensation thrown out the window. However, since we don't get to play games like that when it comes to the MLB CBA, compensation is definitely an issue. For a 34-year old with compensation attached to him, demanding a big overpayment is something that wise MLB teams are just not going to jump into. Unless a club gets really gutsy and loose with its cash, Lohse won't be signed any time soon unless the price comes down.
CF Michael Bourn
To understand what happened with Michael Bourn, it is incredibly important to understand how dynamic the center field market was coming into free agency. Coming into the off season, there were several notable center fielders on the market:
Michael Bourn
B.J. Upton
Angel Pagan
Josh Hamilton (I'll include him simply because some teams probably were ok with him in CF)
Shane Victorino
Melky Cabrera (he played there 144 games with KC in 2011)
Keep in mind, these are just free agents. All six of these players ranked in MLBTR's top 50 free agents heading into the off season. The market expanded even more when the Minnesota Twins started looking for deals to ship off Ben Revere AND Denard Span. What does this mean? Eight center fielders were possibly switching teams, and Bourn was sitting on top of all of them. So, ignoring the fact that this market was uber-deep this year, what should Bourn have gone for? Projection time!
Expected fWAR over the next five years:
2013: 5.5
2014: 4.8
2015: 3.5
2016: 3.0
2017: 2.8
Bourn is a high-BABIP and high-BB% guy whose greatest value comes out of his defense and base running. He is an elite player both on the bases and in the field. However, he is also 30 years old. What does this mean? Well, it means that his speed isn't going to be around forever...or is it? A decent comparison here is Juan Pierre. When Pierre hit age 30, his BsR numbers really started to drop significantly. Some of this could be due to his age 30+ OBP of .341 compared to his pre-age 30 OBP of .348, but I highly doubt that a drop in OBP of .007 lead to BsR numbers roughly half of what they had been before. Pierre's defense also saw a steady decline, because speed doesn't appear to last. Given that, I think the model above is a pretty optimistic model for Bourn (I like to be optimistic in projections because I like to give players the benefit of the doubt). Based on my 5.2 d/WAR projection (again, this may need to be adjusted because of the lucrative TV deals around the league), that would make a 5-year contract for Bourn look like this:
5 years/$102 million*
*Immediate disclaimer: players whose value comes from defense and base running are terribly undervalued on the free agent market. Teams tend to be more wary of defensive value, and they definitely appeared to be more cautious about Bourn's eventual speed decline than I was (and rightfully so, it's not my $102 million that's being thought of as a "fair" contract).
So what did Bourn get? 4/$48 million. I understand being cautious with an aging speed guy, but that figure is less than half of what I thought was a pretty fair contract. The AAV on the actual deal versus the expected deal was $8 million less. So what the heck happened? Time happened. Bourn was signed after B.J. Upton (5/$75), Angel Pagan (4/$45), Josh Hamilton (5/$133), Shane Victorino (3/$39), and Melky Cabrera (2/$16). He also signed after Denard Span was traded to Washington and Ben Revere was traded to Philadelphia. If my math is correct, this makes him the last center fielder on the market with the Indians, Mets, and Rangers all as potential suitors for his services.
Boras got him half of what he deserved and the 3rd-smallest AAV on the CF market. I project him to be slightly more valuable than Josh Hamilton over the next few years, and he signed for 36% of what Hamilton got. Boras' "let the market play itself out" strategy seems to have failed.
RP Rafael Soriano
Had the Nationals not stepped up and been the frequent Boras buyers that they are, Rafael Soriano might also have been a disaster for the Boras Corporation. To start off, the Yankees made Rafael Soriano a qualifying offer (so a 1 year/$13.3 million contract) that Boras advised Soriano to decline. Not only did this prevent Soriano from becoming one of the highest paid relievers in the game, but it also attached compensation to his name. Even with Soriano being the most highly-coveted fee agent reliever on the market, he still only signed a 2 year/$14 million contract with the Nationals (kicker, he gets $14 million in deferred payment to 2018-2025). Soriano gave up a lot of potential cash by turning down the qualifying offer. For starters, the $14 million he's getting might end up actually being less valuable than the $13.3 million he would have gotten with New York, considering money loses value over time. Then, factor in this same concept to the deferred payment. In 2018, I imagine $14 million is going to be a pretty run-of-the-mill AAV. That is being paid off over eight years (so $1.75 million per year) and will be worth far less than money he could have gotten now.
I completely understand that deferring payment gives Soriano the opportunity to go out and sign a new contract, but had he accepted the qualifying offer, his 2013 AAV would be almost twice what it is going to be with Washington, and he would have been immediately able to enter free agency after the season. Again, this feels like Boras didn't read the situation properly. Unless his client severely valued multiple years (hard to believe two years versus one was a huge deal for Soriano), then he lost an opportunity to make his client money.
Future Impact
I think it's pretty clear that Scott Boras read the market incorrectly in 2013. To put it frankly, his clients appear to have gotten screwed out of a lot of potential cash. This is a huge deal, because Boras has a pretty big list of major clients that will be eligible for free agency in the next couple of years. He'll have plenty of time to adjust, but here's a list of Boras clients that will be seeking new deals shortly:
Elvis Andrus, SS (2015)
Robinson Cano, 2B (2014)
Shin-Soo Choo, OF (2014)
Jacoby Ellsbury, OF (2014)
Chris Davis, 1B (2014)
Kendrys Morales, 1B/DH (2014)
Max Scherzer, SP (2015)
Obviously the big kicker here is Robinson Cano. If the Yankees are really serious about getting under the luxury cap by next year, then Cano will very likely hit the free agent market. As the best second baseman in the game, he's going to be seeking the kind of lucrative contract that Boras has been known to land in the past. However, he's going to have compensation attached to his name (foregone conclusion that the Yankees make him a qualifying offer if they can't re-sign him) and the list of potential suitors may be short and sweet.
Let's not forget about the rest of these guys, though. Andrus, Ellsbury, and Scherzer have the ability to all land in the top 50 players in the game in 2013, and I would wager that all three would end up in the top five on future free agent lists. With this kind of bulk about to hit the market, it's incredibly important that Boras avoids playing the waiting game.
Conclusion
As I mentioned earlier, it really seems that Boras badly misplayed this off season. As far as losing his edge goes, I think it's going to take more than one off season to declare Boras as anything less than the best agent in sports. Let's not forget, he turned an ACL tear from Victor Martinez into a 9 year/$214 million contract for Prince Fielder. His upcoming free agents also have skills that pay well in free agency, and Andrus' status as one of the better shortstops to hit the open market in the past ten years would certainly land him a lucrative deal if it ever reached that point. Some food for thought: maybe Boras would be better off to try to negotiate extensions with these teams. After all, it appears that the concept of the qualifying offer may end up dropping the going rates on the free agent market. If this happens, then perhaps there is less incentive for Boras to even let his clients hit the market. While I don't know that that is going to be the case, it is certainly something that Boras will have to explore, because the 2013 off season was a disaster across the board for the Boras Corporation. Something needs to change, or Scott Boras will become a shadow of what he once was.
To set the stage, Boras came into the off season with a few major clients: SP Kyle Lohse, CF Michael Bourn, RP Rafael Soriano, and RP Ryan Madson (who will not be discussed in this post). One would think that due to the 2012 performances of the first three players, Boras would be stuffing a nice wad of money into his bank account after the off season. While he's still stuffing a much larger wad into his account than I am, it's a lot smaller than what it could have been (and I mean a LOT smaller). Let's go case-by-case here, starting with the biggest disaster of them all:
SP Kyle Lohse
I hold this truth to be self-evident: Kyle Lohse is a lot better than a lot of the starters that will be on MLB's 30 rosters come April 1st. I wrote about the fact that he's still not signed here. Today, it was reported on Twitter that Boras is still seeking the same $14-$15 million AAV that teams have been scoffing at for Lohse. I really appreciate persistence and drive to succeed at your job, but there comes a point where you're stuck between a rock and a hard place and need to just give it up. Even teams with protected picks don't appear to be comfortable in signing Lohse to a short-term deal at the price range Boras is seeking. Boras isn't just playing hardball on this one; he's playing diamond ball. Let's forget the compensation issue for a second and ask ourselves, "Would Lohse be overpaid even if he wasn't attached to the loss of a draft pick?" Well, here's a line I'm stealing from my own blog post:
"Knowing Boras and the fact that Edwin Jackson brought in 13 million dollars a season, I would imagine Lohse is looking for something like 4 years, 56 million. Based on my model, this would be an overpayment of about 7 million dollars by the signing team. "
So yes, Boras is looking for a nice overpayment with compensation thrown out the window. However, since we don't get to play games like that when it comes to the MLB CBA, compensation is definitely an issue. For a 34-year old with compensation attached to him, demanding a big overpayment is something that wise MLB teams are just not going to jump into. Unless a club gets really gutsy and loose with its cash, Lohse won't be signed any time soon unless the price comes down.
CF Michael Bourn
To understand what happened with Michael Bourn, it is incredibly important to understand how dynamic the center field market was coming into free agency. Coming into the off season, there were several notable center fielders on the market:
Michael Bourn
B.J. Upton
Angel Pagan
Josh Hamilton (I'll include him simply because some teams probably were ok with him in CF)
Shane Victorino
Melky Cabrera (he played there 144 games with KC in 2011)
Keep in mind, these are just free agents. All six of these players ranked in MLBTR's top 50 free agents heading into the off season. The market expanded even more when the Minnesota Twins started looking for deals to ship off Ben Revere AND Denard Span. What does this mean? Eight center fielders were possibly switching teams, and Bourn was sitting on top of all of them. So, ignoring the fact that this market was uber-deep this year, what should Bourn have gone for? Projection time!
Expected fWAR over the next five years:
2013: 5.5
2014: 4.8
2015: 3.5
2016: 3.0
2017: 2.8
Bourn is a high-BABIP and high-BB% guy whose greatest value comes out of his defense and base running. He is an elite player both on the bases and in the field. However, he is also 30 years old. What does this mean? Well, it means that his speed isn't going to be around forever...or is it? A decent comparison here is Juan Pierre. When Pierre hit age 30, his BsR numbers really started to drop significantly. Some of this could be due to his age 30+ OBP of .341 compared to his pre-age 30 OBP of .348, but I highly doubt that a drop in OBP of .007 lead to BsR numbers roughly half of what they had been before. Pierre's defense also saw a steady decline, because speed doesn't appear to last. Given that, I think the model above is a pretty optimistic model for Bourn (I like to be optimistic in projections because I like to give players the benefit of the doubt). Based on my 5.2 d/WAR projection (again, this may need to be adjusted because of the lucrative TV deals around the league), that would make a 5-year contract for Bourn look like this:
5 years/$102 million*
*Immediate disclaimer: players whose value comes from defense and base running are terribly undervalued on the free agent market. Teams tend to be more wary of defensive value, and they definitely appeared to be more cautious about Bourn's eventual speed decline than I was (and rightfully so, it's not my $102 million that's being thought of as a "fair" contract).
So what did Bourn get? 4/$48 million. I understand being cautious with an aging speed guy, but that figure is less than half of what I thought was a pretty fair contract. The AAV on the actual deal versus the expected deal was $8 million less. So what the heck happened? Time happened. Bourn was signed after B.J. Upton (5/$75), Angel Pagan (4/$45), Josh Hamilton (5/$133), Shane Victorino (3/$39), and Melky Cabrera (2/$16). He also signed after Denard Span was traded to Washington and Ben Revere was traded to Philadelphia. If my math is correct, this makes him the last center fielder on the market with the Indians, Mets, and Rangers all as potential suitors for his services.
Boras got him half of what he deserved and the 3rd-smallest AAV on the CF market. I project him to be slightly more valuable than Josh Hamilton over the next few years, and he signed for 36% of what Hamilton got. Boras' "let the market play itself out" strategy seems to have failed.
RP Rafael Soriano
Had the Nationals not stepped up and been the frequent Boras buyers that they are, Rafael Soriano might also have been a disaster for the Boras Corporation. To start off, the Yankees made Rafael Soriano a qualifying offer (so a 1 year/$13.3 million contract) that Boras advised Soriano to decline. Not only did this prevent Soriano from becoming one of the highest paid relievers in the game, but it also attached compensation to his name. Even with Soriano being the most highly-coveted fee agent reliever on the market, he still only signed a 2 year/$14 million contract with the Nationals (kicker, he gets $14 million in deferred payment to 2018-2025). Soriano gave up a lot of potential cash by turning down the qualifying offer. For starters, the $14 million he's getting might end up actually being less valuable than the $13.3 million he would have gotten with New York, considering money loses value over time. Then, factor in this same concept to the deferred payment. In 2018, I imagine $14 million is going to be a pretty run-of-the-mill AAV. That is being paid off over eight years (so $1.75 million per year) and will be worth far less than money he could have gotten now.
I completely understand that deferring payment gives Soriano the opportunity to go out and sign a new contract, but had he accepted the qualifying offer, his 2013 AAV would be almost twice what it is going to be with Washington, and he would have been immediately able to enter free agency after the season. Again, this feels like Boras didn't read the situation properly. Unless his client severely valued multiple years (hard to believe two years versus one was a huge deal for Soriano), then he lost an opportunity to make his client money.
Future Impact
I think it's pretty clear that Scott Boras read the market incorrectly in 2013. To put it frankly, his clients appear to have gotten screwed out of a lot of potential cash. This is a huge deal, because Boras has a pretty big list of major clients that will be eligible for free agency in the next couple of years. He'll have plenty of time to adjust, but here's a list of Boras clients that will be seeking new deals shortly:
Elvis Andrus, SS (2015)
Robinson Cano, 2B (2014)
Shin-Soo Choo, OF (2014)
Jacoby Ellsbury, OF (2014)
Chris Davis, 1B (2014)
Kendrys Morales, 1B/DH (2014)
Max Scherzer, SP (2015)
Obviously the big kicker here is Robinson Cano. If the Yankees are really serious about getting under the luxury cap by next year, then Cano will very likely hit the free agent market. As the best second baseman in the game, he's going to be seeking the kind of lucrative contract that Boras has been known to land in the past. However, he's going to have compensation attached to his name (foregone conclusion that the Yankees make him a qualifying offer if they can't re-sign him) and the list of potential suitors may be short and sweet.
Let's not forget about the rest of these guys, though. Andrus, Ellsbury, and Scherzer have the ability to all land in the top 50 players in the game in 2013, and I would wager that all three would end up in the top five on future free agent lists. With this kind of bulk about to hit the market, it's incredibly important that Boras avoids playing the waiting game.
Conclusion
As I mentioned earlier, it really seems that Boras badly misplayed this off season. As far as losing his edge goes, I think it's going to take more than one off season to declare Boras as anything less than the best agent in sports. Let's not forget, he turned an ACL tear from Victor Martinez into a 9 year/$214 million contract for Prince Fielder. His upcoming free agents also have skills that pay well in free agency, and Andrus' status as one of the better shortstops to hit the open market in the past ten years would certainly land him a lucrative deal if it ever reached that point. Some food for thought: maybe Boras would be better off to try to negotiate extensions with these teams. After all, it appears that the concept of the qualifying offer may end up dropping the going rates on the free agent market. If this happens, then perhaps there is less incentive for Boras to even let his clients hit the market. While I don't know that that is going to be the case, it is certainly something that Boras will have to explore, because the 2013 off season was a disaster across the board for the Boras Corporation. Something needs to change, or Scott Boras will become a shadow of what he once was.
Wednesday, March 13, 2013
Guest Post: Prospect Previews- Baltimore Orioles
Hope you didn't blink, because he's back again!
"I might be more down on the Baltimore Orioles than most. I think everyone agrees they were very fortunate in 2012, and while they have some good offensive pieces including recently-graduated superstar prospect Manny Machado, I don’t really know that their pitching can hold up again. Fortunately for them, that’s where their strength lies in farm system, including a couple of near major league ready blue-chippers not unlike the Mets’ Law Firm of Harvey and Wheeler ®. I also still like non-rookie guys like Zach Britton and Jake Arrieta. There is certainly a scenario where the Orioles could end up being right back in the thick of the playoff chase; I just wouldn’t bet on it.
The Blue-Chippers: You know the number one male baby name in 2012? Dylan. That’s because Dylan Bundy is every scout’s dream as a pitching prospect, and every one of them wanted to do everything in their power to brag that they could produce someone as Bundyriffic as Dylan Bundy from their very own loins.
Okay, so every bit of that first paragraph aside from the first independent clause in sentence two is probably not true. But it might as well be. Dylan Bundy is the answer. He is the answer to our job crisis. He is the answer to the Catholic church’s search for a new Pope. He’s the answer to Parks and Recreation’s mind-bogglingly low ratings. Dylan Bundy is the answer to ESPN’s ESPNness. He is the answer to your relationship problems. He is the answer to our political stalemate. He is the answer to our broken education system. He is the answer to North Korea. He is the answer to prospecting. Dylan Bundy is the answer to all questions that have ever been asked, will ever be asked, and to the questions nobody asked.
Dylan Bundy is The Answer™.
And if Dylan Bundy is The Answer™, then Kevin Gausman, of course, is the question. Arguably a top 10-15 prospect himself, Gausman was drafted 4th overall out of LSU in the 2012 draft. He only threw 13 innings after signing, but I’ve already managed to impregnate my girlfriend and bring Kevin Gausman Floyd into the world.
Okay, so that isn’t true either. But Gausman hits the upper nineties with his fastball, gets great sinking action on it, and has a true wipeout changeup. His control is also very good for a pitcher his age. He is less likely to reach the majors this year than Bundy is, but if they once again find themselves in the playoff race, he could find himself in a big league bullpen at the end of the year, a la Bundy in 2012.
Gausman probably fits more as a squinter, but that would ruin the entire narrative I had going, and we obviously can’t have that.
The Squinters: Beyond The Question and The Answer, there isn’t too much for the Orioles to get excited about. There are a handful of potential relief arms and reserves who could prove useful, but they’re pretty much set at most positions. One they aren’t set at, due to Brian Roberts’ unfortunate chronic concussion issues, is second base.
So, while it’s a bit of a reach, I’ll go ahead and tab Jonathan Schoop (pronounced “Scope”) as a squinter. Born with halitosis, Schoop’s parents quickly changed the family’s surname so as to not have to remind Jonathan to wash consistently in an attempt to mask his embarrassing condition.
As you must know by now, all of that is a lie. Earth would be a better planet as a whole if it were true, though. Schoop is an interesting case in that he hasn’t really showcased his tools in terms of putting up numbers but still found himself at Double-A in 2012. His numbers weren’t particularly impressive, but he held his own. Schoop has very good raw power but hadn’t started really tapping into it until the AFL this offseason. The Orioles hope it’s a sign of things to come in 2013. If it is, and a spot opens up, I wouldn’t put it past them to push Schoop aggressively just as they did Machado.
The Sleepers: I hate Tyler Wilson. He hasn’t done anything to me personally. I don’t know the guy. But he is remarkably uninteresting, which ruins the tone of this entire entry. He has a boring name and boring stuff.
His fastball, curve, and change are all average but play up due to excellent command. He doesn’t walk people, registering only 30 in 143 innings between low-A and high-A in 2012. He’ll spend the entire season as a 23 year old, and given his profile could move quickly if given success.
But I hope he fails. Seriously. I’m done writing about him. He’s ruined the vibe. He’s ruined my post. I hope you get Jason Neighborgall disease and start walking every other batter, Tyler. You’ve made an enemy for life. For. Life.
Other potential contributors: TJ McFarland, Mike Belfiore, Xavier Avery"
"I might be more down on the Baltimore Orioles than most. I think everyone agrees they were very fortunate in 2012, and while they have some good offensive pieces including recently-graduated superstar prospect Manny Machado, I don’t really know that their pitching can hold up again. Fortunately for them, that’s where their strength lies in farm system, including a couple of near major league ready blue-chippers not unlike the Mets’ Law Firm of Harvey and Wheeler ®. I also still like non-rookie guys like Zach Britton and Jake Arrieta. There is certainly a scenario where the Orioles could end up being right back in the thick of the playoff chase; I just wouldn’t bet on it.
The Blue-Chippers: You know the number one male baby name in 2012? Dylan. That’s because Dylan Bundy is every scout’s dream as a pitching prospect, and every one of them wanted to do everything in their power to brag that they could produce someone as Bundyriffic as Dylan Bundy from their very own loins.
Okay, so every bit of that first paragraph aside from the first independent clause in sentence two is probably not true. But it might as well be. Dylan Bundy is the answer. He is the answer to our job crisis. He is the answer to the Catholic church’s search for a new Pope. He’s the answer to Parks and Recreation’s mind-bogglingly low ratings. Dylan Bundy is the answer to ESPN’s ESPNness. He is the answer to your relationship problems. He is the answer to our political stalemate. He is the answer to our broken education system. He is the answer to North Korea. He is the answer to prospecting. Dylan Bundy is the answer to all questions that have ever been asked, will ever be asked, and to the questions nobody asked.
Dylan Bundy is The Answer™.
And if Dylan Bundy is The Answer™, then Kevin Gausman, of course, is the question. Arguably a top 10-15 prospect himself, Gausman was drafted 4th overall out of LSU in the 2012 draft. He only threw 13 innings after signing, but I’ve already managed to impregnate my girlfriend and bring Kevin Gausman Floyd into the world.
Okay, so that isn’t true either. But Gausman hits the upper nineties with his fastball, gets great sinking action on it, and has a true wipeout changeup. His control is also very good for a pitcher his age. He is less likely to reach the majors this year than Bundy is, but if they once again find themselves in the playoff race, he could find himself in a big league bullpen at the end of the year, a la Bundy in 2012.
Gausman probably fits more as a squinter, but that would ruin the entire narrative I had going, and we obviously can’t have that.
The Squinters: Beyond The Question and The Answer, there isn’t too much for the Orioles to get excited about. There are a handful of potential relief arms and reserves who could prove useful, but they’re pretty much set at most positions. One they aren’t set at, due to Brian Roberts’ unfortunate chronic concussion issues, is second base.
So, while it’s a bit of a reach, I’ll go ahead and tab Jonathan Schoop (pronounced “Scope”) as a squinter. Born with halitosis, Schoop’s parents quickly changed the family’s surname so as to not have to remind Jonathan to wash consistently in an attempt to mask his embarrassing condition.
As you must know by now, all of that is a lie. Earth would be a better planet as a whole if it were true, though. Schoop is an interesting case in that he hasn’t really showcased his tools in terms of putting up numbers but still found himself at Double-A in 2012. His numbers weren’t particularly impressive, but he held his own. Schoop has very good raw power but hadn’t started really tapping into it until the AFL this offseason. The Orioles hope it’s a sign of things to come in 2013. If it is, and a spot opens up, I wouldn’t put it past them to push Schoop aggressively just as they did Machado.
The Sleepers: I hate Tyler Wilson. He hasn’t done anything to me personally. I don’t know the guy. But he is remarkably uninteresting, which ruins the tone of this entire entry. He has a boring name and boring stuff.
His fastball, curve, and change are all average but play up due to excellent command. He doesn’t walk people, registering only 30 in 143 innings between low-A and high-A in 2012. He’ll spend the entire season as a 23 year old, and given his profile could move quickly if given success.
But I hope he fails. Seriously. I’m done writing about him. He’s ruined the vibe. He’s ruined my post. I hope you get Jason Neighborgall disease and start walking every other batter, Tyler. You’ve made an enemy for life. For. Life.
Other potential contributors: TJ McFarland, Mike Belfiore, Xavier Avery"
Guest Post: Prospect Previews- Colorado Rockies
Hero's back with another post!
"For a club as bad as the Colorado Rockies, they don’t have the super top-tier prospects you might think they would. They are very much a team in transition. There is a lot of young talent that I like (and have for years), but many of them are past the rookie threshold. Most of their better prospects currently reside in the lower levels. There is still talent here, but this overview would look a lot more interesting next season.
The Blue-Chippers: Nolan Arenado has become a somewhat enigmatic prospect. Scouts and prospect-followers drooled over his tools after a very good performance in 2011, especially for a 20-year old in High-A. The Cal league is a noted good hitting environment, but everyone who saw him thought he was legit; Baseball America ranked him #42 entering the 2012 season. The only real knock on him was defensive ability – for many, he had work to do if he were to remain a third baseman long term.
Then came 2012. Admittedly very young for Double-A at just 21, Arenado struggled at times, including a terrible stretch in the middle of the year. Questions about his makeup and work ethic arose, both from prospectors like Keith Law and his own GM, Dan O’Dowd. He improved his defense and now is considered a good bet to be solid at third, and he did pick it up offensively toward the end of the year. Still, his overall line didn't match his tools; he didn’t make consistently good contact, and his power vanished for much of the year.
Arenado still came in at #52 on BA’s 2013 top 100 prospect list, indicating that he still has his believers. Plus, he remains very young at 22 years old. He’s had a very good spring so far and there have been rumblings that he could open the year as Colorado’s starting third baseman. That would be a mistake, in my opinion, and I think the Rockies will eventually see it that way. I’d send him back to Double-A and promote him as his performance dictates. It’s not out of the question that he could be a productive major leaguer this season; you can never count out everything just suddenly clicking for guys with his tools. But, I think it’d be wise to let him prove it in the minors first, gaining whatever seasoning he needs along the way.
I’m a sucker for sinker-slider guys, and Chad Bettis fits that profile. Bettis was drafted in 2010 with the Rockies’ 2nd overall pick. Never considered to have an otherworldly ceiling, he still was seen as a fairly solid bet to be a productive major league pitcher. There where whispers that he may end up a closer due to his lack of a good changeup, but he helped to silence those whispers a bit with a very good showing in the Cal League in 2011. Unfortunately, he missed all of 2012 with a shoulder injury, so now it’s tough to really project anything.
Bettis is coming along slowly in spring training and presumably would start 2013 in the minors (Double-A, I’d guess). Bettis probably fits better as a squinter due to his health issues, but he’s always been a favorite of mine and the Rockies aren’t exactly teeming with major league quality starters. If he’s healthy, he could be a factor.
The Squinters: There are a lot of decent squinter/sleeper candidates for the Rockies because, aside from Tulowitzki, Cargo, and Todd Helton, nobody has a particularly strong hold on a roster spot. Wilin Rosario had a nice year for a catcher in 2012, but could turn into Miguel Olivo at any given time, as far as I’m concerned.
Ryan Wheeler has hit just about everywhere he’s been in the minors, including a monster 2012 in Reno, but I could hit 20 homers in Reno, so stats there have to largely be taken with a grain of salt. But there’s something to be said for always hitting, and although Wheeler doesn’t have great tools at all and stands at a burly 6’3/235, limiting his athletic capabilities, he’s got juice in his bat. He is far from great at third base, and probably projects better at first defensively, but the only guys standing in front of him at third are Chris Nelson and Jordan Pacheco. Not exactly world-beaters. If Wheeler has another great showing in Triple-A, likely since he’ll call Colorado Springs his home, the Rockies might stomach his defense and see if he can do more at the plate in the majors than he did in a short trial last season for Arizona.
I’m not the biggest Tim Wheeler (no relation) supporter, but after hitting 33 homers albeit while showing a large platoon split in Double-A in 2011, he didn’t exactly get a chance to show he could be more than a righty-masher in 2012 due to a hamate injury that sapped just about all his power. If he starts hitting bombs like there’s no tomorrow like he did in 2011, then just like the former Wheeler, I think the Rockies will give him a chance to sink or swim in 2013.
The Sleepers: On the surface, Rob Scahill looks like somewhat of a non-factor given his 5.68 ERA in 2012. However, that came at the previously noted Colorado Springs, only a slightly less hitter-friendly environment than Reno. His 3.64 FIP indicates his true talents much better, and matches what he did at Double-A in 2011. He’s an older pitcher at 26, but Scahill is the Rockies’ version of the “relatively low upside but could surprise” guy. Unlike the others, though, Cahill doesn’t have bad stuff. He reaches the mid 90s with his fastball and sits in the upper 80s with his slider. But also unlike the others, his control is erratic – the main thing that keeps his ceiling relatively low. He’ll never be Tom Glavine in terms of execution within the strike zone, but if he can make even small improvements he could find himself at the back of someone’s rotation. If not, he could also succeed as a reliever.
Other potential contributors: Charlie Culberson, Joe Gardner"
MLB Landscaping, Part One: Count, Age, and Experience
Something I have always been interested in doing is taking a wide-angle look at the MLB player pool. In discussions, WAR and other statistics are most often used to compare individuals. While this is always a fun exercise, I feel these arguments often ignore other contexts that are important. For example, take a look at how WAR is calculated. The baseline players are compared to is the concept of "replacement level." While this is intelligent and is one way to look at it, this formation of value ignores the existing talent within MLB. For example, shortstops get a big boost for replacement value. However, what if there were, say, 45 shortstops all capable of producing three wins of value? At the same time, what are the skills of those shortstops? Are they more offensive or defensive minded? Do they run the bases well? Knowing these contexts helps form an idea of value. Now, this isn't a novel idea, as I know teams do it all the time. They look at skills across the board, age, medicals, and financial commitments. For the sake of my own knowledge and to help everyone learn a bit more about baseball, I want to break things down so that we all can have a better idea of what makes up the MLB landscape.
Part One: Set Up
In short, this study looks at data found on Fangraphs and analyzes the 417 position players and pitchers that produced at least a win of value by the site's WAR calculation. I will break down this data into categories based on age and position. To avoid creating too much confusion in my own analysis and to save the length of this post, I will be breaking down a small collection of stats: WAR, wRC+, UZR, BsR, and xFIP. Unfortunately, I do not have the time to break down all of the aspects of each stat so we will be taking some averages of rates. For example, when I average out the "average" xFIP for left-handed starters, I won't have the ability to calculate it by adding up the totals in each category and plugging it into the overall formula (and I can't use fangraphs, because I only want to include these 417 players), so you'll have to take the number for what it really is.
Now, I need to talk a bit about how I collected and sorted the data. I decided it would be best to export leader board tables from Fangraphs directly into Microsoft Excel. Once I did this, I used the resulting table to form a pivot table. This allowed me to sort data out by position, age, individual player, and in just about any other fashion I wanted. I also used COUNTIF, SUMIF, and other Excel functions to create other, smaller tables. Now that the boring part of this is explained, let's get into the study.
Part Two: Count
The first thing I really want to get into when breaking down this analysis is who we are dealing with and where they are at in their careers. As I mentioned earlier, this study was limited to players that obtained a minimum of one win of value by Fangraphs' version of WAR during the 2012 season. This is a position-by-position breakdown of the number of players at each position (note: players are listed by the primary position they played in 2012):
This really shows some interesting results. Firstly, I find the low numbers of first basemen and designated hitters to be intriguing. Since I listed players who appeared primarily at a given position, this provides some interesting insight. Only 8 regular DH players attained a value of one WAR. Now, as you may know, the DH only existed for 14 teams in 2012, so this means that about half the teams in the AL had regular DH contributors. This speaks to the nature of the modern DH position. Teams prefer to use it as a platoon spot and as a revolving door rather than as a set position. For first baseman, the count may serve as much a reflection of the position as a reflection of how WAR is calculated. Right now, the first base position is historically weak as I wrote here. Due to this, the position isn't as deep as normal. Part of this could be due to the modern emphasis on other positions (make no mistake, players pay attention to modern talk about positional value), and another part of this could be that the baseline replacement level at first base makes it really hard to produce value as a first baseman. Low replacement level reflects the difficultly of playing a position well as well as the scarcity by which those replacements can be found. It's easy to find someone acceptable to play first base. This does not mean, however, that it's easy to produce value at first base. As a fun note, if I were to include secondary positions, the number of players that spent notable time at first base shoots up to 29, which hints at the fact that teams are starting to use first base a lot like they use the DH. Many players can play the position, so players get moved in and out as to create more room to create value at other positions.
On the flip side, the other offensive positions averaged darn close to one regular per position that could produce a win of value. Some of this is due to positional depth, some of it is due to the increased importance on playing these positions, and some of it is due to the fact that playing these positions is harder which blocks the revolving door practice.
Part Three: Age
As I wrote that piece about young first basemen in the league, I began to think about what the age breakdown was across the league. I wanted to know, among the players who produced at least a win of value, how old each position was and how value was being produced by age. To start, here's a table showing the total count of players by each age present in my sample:
There are absolutely no surprises here. 58.99% of the players in the 417 player sample are between the ages of 25 and 30, which are often considered the "prime" years of a career. To continue with this "prime" year thing, here's a breakdown of WAR by age:
Again, absolutely no surprises here. Players between the ages of 25-30 produced 59.55% of the value (648.6 total wins). Before I start making some more observations, here is the breakdown of age by position:
Alright, finally getting to some surprises! Unfortunately...well...there's only one real surprise here. The average age of right and left-handed relievers seems surprisingly low to me. In my mind, relievers have more staying power than their starting counterparts. They log fewer innings, take less time to warm up, and in some cases have converted from being starters in their early years to being relievers later. To see them not be noticeably older than starting pitchers was initially surprising. Then, I began to think about how long starters can take to develop. The phrase "there's no such thing as a pitching prospect" exists for a reason. Pitching is really hard to develop, and it takes a lot of time to do so. When thinking about this, it became less surprising that relievers weren't noticeably older than starters.
Overall, I believe the league is in a typical state in terms of age. The occasional phenom will come up early and contribute, but most of the value and performance is found in players who are in their prime years. The positions are all relatively the same age outside of the DH. I believe the DH is older because the position doesn't require the amount of work every day that other positions do. Because of this, older players can feel more comfortable and theoretically last longer because they don't have to work on as many things.
Part Four: Years of Experience
I'll be frank: I've always felt that age curves are a bit biased. I don't believe a player will progress or regress simply because they reach a certain age. Just as with any skill, your ability to get better is a mix of your physical capabilities as well as your capacity to obtain knowledge. To understand my point, take a hypothetical player "X". "X" is an ex-blue chip prospect who came up at 19 years old. After five years of playing time, he has only gotten marginally better. However, since he is 24 going on 25, there is an expectation among some fans and media that he will get better simply because he is growing into that time period of being 25-30 years old where most value is expected to be produced. In my mind, I believe it is a mistake to think "X" will get better. There's only so much knowledge you can obtain as a person, and your physical abilities can only peak at a certain level. With this, I'll get into how I charted years of experience.
When I think of a year of experience, I don't just mean the passing of a year of time. I think about taking a year, playing a lot, and being able to work on your skills and knowledge. Because of this, I didn't want to include a 40-game, injury-riddled season for a player where he has to spend the majority of his time recovering from an injury instead of building on his skills. This led me to the following minimums in order to count a season as a year of experience in a player's career:
1) For position players, the rule is 81 games played minimum. Anything less than half a season is not counted.
2) For starters, 15 starts is the minimum.
3) For relievers, 30 IP is the minimum (an argument could be made that this should be 45 as to eliminate LOOGY's)
4) For pitchers, I only count years at the current position. What I mean by this is that a reliever who converts to a starter (and vice versa) will only have a year counted if it matches their current position.
Now that you know the rules, here are the tables:
Ah, now this chart is a bit more revealing than others have been. To start, the catcher position comes with a bit of an asterisk. Early in their careers, I found that catchers are far less likely than other positions to play enough to log a year of experience. Given how much goes into catching, this isn't a surprise at all. Catchers have to know upwards of 12-13 pitchers on a roster, which is a lot of information to process. Combine that with the massive difficulty of catcher defense (let alone offense) and it's easy to understand why catchers don't have many *full* years of experience. Another immediate observation is that the center field position is exceptionally ill-experienced, and the position is actually much younger than the other positions. It is apparent that the position is trending upward. Other than right field, it appears that the typical number of years of experience rests between 4.25 and 5.0 years of experience, which makes total sense. If most of the value and talent is currently in the age 25-30 range, then these players will have come up between the ages of 21-26, which is pretty darn typical.
To get back to my initial point, here's a table showing average WAR by Years of Experience:
The only real noticeable pattern here is that younger players don't produce much. In fact, it appears that performance was pretty consistent from 4-14 years of experience. There could be plenty of reasons for this. For one, a player is probably only playing 14 years in the Major Leagues if he is really, really good. If he has reached the ability to produce three wins of value 14 years into his career, then I have to imagine that he was producing quite a bit of value in his prime years. Whatever the reasons, it would appear that experience is very important in terms of producing value. Something that is great to see here is that players with 10+ years of experience are still performing at a high level. I think something that is often missed is that experience helps ease the pain of declining physically. While it's quite obvious that prime years are the best for producing, it's important to remember that those players have often been in the league for 3+ years on a full-time basis. Now, it should also be noted that older players start to retire and are weeded out by younger players who are looking for a chance. Because of this, there are fewer bad or marginal older players than there are younger players. Older players that can't contribute at above-average levels don't get the jobs that younger players do.
Now that I've gone on about count, age, and experience...it's time to take a break. Part 2 is below (aka, it was posted first!)
Part One: Set Up
In short, this study looks at data found on Fangraphs and analyzes the 417 position players and pitchers that produced at least a win of value by the site's WAR calculation. I will break down this data into categories based on age and position. To avoid creating too much confusion in my own analysis and to save the length of this post, I will be breaking down a small collection of stats: WAR, wRC+, UZR, BsR, and xFIP. Unfortunately, I do not have the time to break down all of the aspects of each stat so we will be taking some averages of rates. For example, when I average out the "average" xFIP for left-handed starters, I won't have the ability to calculate it by adding up the totals in each category and plugging it into the overall formula (and I can't use fangraphs, because I only want to include these 417 players), so you'll have to take the number for what it really is.
Now, I need to talk a bit about how I collected and sorted the data. I decided it would be best to export leader board tables from Fangraphs directly into Microsoft Excel. Once I did this, I used the resulting table to form a pivot table. This allowed me to sort data out by position, age, individual player, and in just about any other fashion I wanted. I also used COUNTIF, SUMIF, and other Excel functions to create other, smaller tables. Now that the boring part of this is explained, let's get into the study.
Part Two: Count
The first thing I really want to get into when breaking down this analysis is who we are dealing with and where they are at in their careers. As I mentioned earlier, this study was limited to players that obtained a minimum of one win of value by Fangraphs' version of WAR during the 2012 season. This is a position-by-position breakdown of the number of players at each position (note: players are listed by the primary position they played in 2012):
| Count by Position | |
| 1B | 19 |
| 2B | 26 |
| 3B | 30 |
| C | 33 |
| CF | 34 |
| DH | 8 |
| LF | 28 |
| RF | 29 |
| RPL | 11 |
| RPR | 39 |
| SPL | 43 |
| SPR | 89 |
| SS | 28 |
This really shows some interesting results. Firstly, I find the low numbers of first basemen and designated hitters to be intriguing. Since I listed players who appeared primarily at a given position, this provides some interesting insight. Only 8 regular DH players attained a value of one WAR. Now, as you may know, the DH only existed for 14 teams in 2012, so this means that about half the teams in the AL had regular DH contributors. This speaks to the nature of the modern DH position. Teams prefer to use it as a platoon spot and as a revolving door rather than as a set position. For first baseman, the count may serve as much a reflection of the position as a reflection of how WAR is calculated. Right now, the first base position is historically weak as I wrote here. Due to this, the position isn't as deep as normal. Part of this could be due to the modern emphasis on other positions (make no mistake, players pay attention to modern talk about positional value), and another part of this could be that the baseline replacement level at first base makes it really hard to produce value as a first baseman. Low replacement level reflects the difficultly of playing a position well as well as the scarcity by which those replacements can be found. It's easy to find someone acceptable to play first base. This does not mean, however, that it's easy to produce value at first base. As a fun note, if I were to include secondary positions, the number of players that spent notable time at first base shoots up to 29, which hints at the fact that teams are starting to use first base a lot like they use the DH. Many players can play the position, so players get moved in and out as to create more room to create value at other positions.
On the flip side, the other offensive positions averaged darn close to one regular per position that could produce a win of value. Some of this is due to positional depth, some of it is due to the increased importance on playing these positions, and some of it is due to the fact that playing these positions is harder which blocks the revolving door practice.
Part Three: Age
As I wrote that piece about young first basemen in the league, I began to think about what the age breakdown was across the league. I wanted to know, among the players who produced at least a win of value, how old each position was and how value was being produced by age. To start, here's a table showing the total count of players by each age present in my sample:
| Total Count by Age | |
| 20 | 2 |
| 21 | 1 |
| 22 | 0 |
| 23 | 15 |
| 24 | 17 |
| 25 | 27 |
| 26 | 43 |
| 27 | 47 |
| 28 | 41 |
| 29 | 47 |
| 30 | 41 |
| 31 | 22 |
| 32 | 27 |
| 33 | 20 |
| 34 | 19 |
| 35 | 9 |
| 36 | 14 |
| 37 | 11 |
| 38 | 5 |
| 39 | 4 |
| 40 | 2 |
| 41 | 2 |
| 42 | 1 |
There are absolutely no surprises here. 58.99% of the players in the 417 player sample are between the ages of 25 and 30, which are often considered the "prime" years of a career. To continue with this "prime" year thing, here's a breakdown of WAR by age:
| Total WAR by Age | |
| 20 | 6.2 |
| 21 | 10 |
| 22 | 0 |
| 23 | 40 |
| 24 | 41.3 |
| 25 | 64.9 |
| 26 | 106 |
| 27 | 127.5 |
| 28 | 95.1 |
| 29 | 133.8 |
| 30 | 121.3 |
| 31 | 58.4 |
| 32 | 75.6 |
| 33 | 45.1 |
| 34 | 51.5 |
| 35 | 20.8 |
| 36 | 32.5 |
| 37 | 26.5 |
| 38 | 13.7 |
| 39 | 5.2 |
| 40 | 9.8 |
| 41 | 2.8 |
| 42 | 1.1 |
Again, absolutely no surprises here. Players between the ages of 25-30 produced 59.55% of the value (648.6 total wins). Before I start making some more observations, here is the breakdown of age by position:
| Average Age by Position | |
| 1B | 28.89 |
| 2B | 29.58 |
| 3B | 29.10 |
| C | 29.06 |
| CF | 28.06 |
| DH | 32.13 |
| LF | 29.43 |
| RF | 30.38 |
| RPL | 29.82 |
| RPR | 30.46 |
| SPL | 28.65 |
| SPR | 29.28 |
| SS | 29.46 |
Alright, finally getting to some surprises! Unfortunately...well...there's only one real surprise here. The average age of right and left-handed relievers seems surprisingly low to me. In my mind, relievers have more staying power than their starting counterparts. They log fewer innings, take less time to warm up, and in some cases have converted from being starters in their early years to being relievers later. To see them not be noticeably older than starting pitchers was initially surprising. Then, I began to think about how long starters can take to develop. The phrase "there's no such thing as a pitching prospect" exists for a reason. Pitching is really hard to develop, and it takes a lot of time to do so. When thinking about this, it became less surprising that relievers weren't noticeably older than starters.
Overall, I believe the league is in a typical state in terms of age. The occasional phenom will come up early and contribute, but most of the value and performance is found in players who are in their prime years. The positions are all relatively the same age outside of the DH. I believe the DH is older because the position doesn't require the amount of work every day that other positions do. Because of this, older players can feel more comfortable and theoretically last longer because they don't have to work on as many things.
Part Four: Years of Experience
I'll be frank: I've always felt that age curves are a bit biased. I don't believe a player will progress or regress simply because they reach a certain age. Just as with any skill, your ability to get better is a mix of your physical capabilities as well as your capacity to obtain knowledge. To understand my point, take a hypothetical player "X". "X" is an ex-blue chip prospect who came up at 19 years old. After five years of playing time, he has only gotten marginally better. However, since he is 24 going on 25, there is an expectation among some fans and media that he will get better simply because he is growing into that time period of being 25-30 years old where most value is expected to be produced. In my mind, I believe it is a mistake to think "X" will get better. There's only so much knowledge you can obtain as a person, and your physical abilities can only peak at a certain level. With this, I'll get into how I charted years of experience.
When I think of a year of experience, I don't just mean the passing of a year of time. I think about taking a year, playing a lot, and being able to work on your skills and knowledge. Because of this, I didn't want to include a 40-game, injury-riddled season for a player where he has to spend the majority of his time recovering from an injury instead of building on his skills. This led me to the following minimums in order to count a season as a year of experience in a player's career:
1) For position players, the rule is 81 games played minimum. Anything less than half a season is not counted.
2) For starters, 15 starts is the minimum.
3) For relievers, 30 IP is the minimum (an argument could be made that this should be 45 as to eliminate LOOGY's)
4) For pitchers, I only count years at the current position. What I mean by this is that a reliever who converts to a starter (and vice versa) will only have a year counted if it matches their current position.
Now that you know the rules, here are the tables:
| Total Years of Experience by Position | ||
| 1B | 87 | |
| 2B | 127 | |
| 3B | 144 | |
| C | 108 | |
| CF | 115 | |
| DH | 62 | |
| LF | 119 | |
| RF | 166 | |
| RPL | 40 | |
| RPR | 176 | |
| SPL | 184 | |
| SPR | 409 | |
| SS | 137 | |
| Average # of Years of Exp by Position | |||
| 1B | 4.58 | ||
| 2B | 4.88 | ||
| 3B | 4.80 | ||
| C | 3.27 | ||
| CF | 3.38 | ||
| DH | 7.75 | ||
| LF | 4.25 | ||
| RF | 5.72 | ||
| RPL | 3.64 | ||
| RPR | 4.51 | ||
| SPL | 4.28 | ||
| SPR | 4.60 | ||
| SS | 4.89 | ||
Ah, now this chart is a bit more revealing than others have been. To start, the catcher position comes with a bit of an asterisk. Early in their careers, I found that catchers are far less likely than other positions to play enough to log a year of experience. Given how much goes into catching, this isn't a surprise at all. Catchers have to know upwards of 12-13 pitchers on a roster, which is a lot of information to process. Combine that with the massive difficulty of catcher defense (let alone offense) and it's easy to understand why catchers don't have many *full* years of experience. Another immediate observation is that the center field position is exceptionally ill-experienced, and the position is actually much younger than the other positions. It is apparent that the position is trending upward. Other than right field, it appears that the typical number of years of experience rests between 4.25 and 5.0 years of experience, which makes total sense. If most of the value and talent is currently in the age 25-30 range, then these players will have come up between the ages of 21-26, which is pretty darn typical.
To get back to my initial point, here's a table showing average WAR by Years of Experience:
| WAR by YOE | |
| 0 | 1.65 |
| 1 | 2.17 |
| 2 | 2.30 |
| 3 | 2.52 |
| 4 | 2.78 |
| 5 | 2.95 |
| 6 | 2.81 |
| 7 | 3.11 |
| 8 | 3.06 |
| 9 | 2.67 |
| 10 | 2.91 |
| 11 | 2.29 |
| 12 | 3.64 |
| 13 | 2.90 |
| 14 | 3.33 |
| 16 | 1.70 |
| 17 | 2.70 |
The only real noticeable pattern here is that younger players don't produce much. In fact, it appears that performance was pretty consistent from 4-14 years of experience. There could be plenty of reasons for this. For one, a player is probably only playing 14 years in the Major Leagues if he is really, really good. If he has reached the ability to produce three wins of value 14 years into his career, then I have to imagine that he was producing quite a bit of value in his prime years. Whatever the reasons, it would appear that experience is very important in terms of producing value. Something that is great to see here is that players with 10+ years of experience are still performing at a high level. I think something that is often missed is that experience helps ease the pain of declining physically. While it's quite obvious that prime years are the best for producing, it's important to remember that those players have often been in the league for 3+ years on a full-time basis. Now, it should also be noted that older players start to retire and are weeded out by younger players who are looking for a chance. Because of this, there are fewer bad or marginal older players than there are younger players. Older players that can't contribute at above-average levels don't get the jobs that younger players do.
Now that I've gone on about count, age, and experience...it's time to take a break. Part 2 is below (aka, it was posted first!)
MLB Landscaping, Part Two: Where the Skills Are
It's one thing to know where the youth/experience is among MLB's positions, but it's another thing to know where they value is and how that value is composed. To keep the introduction here short and sweet, this post is all about breaking down which positions are producing the most talent and how the talent at those positions is being accrued. Let's begin.
Some notes:
Part One: WAR
I've already talked about the initial problems with WAR and how the replacement level baseline doesn't tell you much about the distribution of talent at the MLB level, so let's get right into a chart:
| Average WAR by Position | ||
| 1B | 2.78 | |
| 2B | 2.96 | |
| 3B | 3.17 | |
| C | 2.73 | |
| CF | 3.37 | |
| DH | 2.43 | |
| LF | 2.82 | |
| RF | 2.77 | |
| RPL | 1.53 | |
| RPR | 1.49 | |
| SPL | 2.54 | |
| SPR | 2.52 | |
| SS | 2.54 | |
This is really fun to look at, because you can look at both sides of WAR. On one hand, we already know that it's hardest to produce value at 1B, LF, and RF. We also know it's easiest to produce value at SS, 2B, and C (when I say "easiest" I mean you have to do less compared to the league average player to produce your value at said position). However, look at the value for shortstop. Even though this position sees one of the biggest bumps in positional value, it still produces the least amount of value. This implies that the position is incredibly hard to play and pretty darn thin. As we've seen with Troy Tulowitzki, Jose Reyes, and Hanley Ramirez, the position comes with a seemingly high rate of injury occurrence. With how amazing these players are (the same thing goes for catchers), maintaining their greatness is made harder by the fact that it's tougher to stay on the field. Meanwhile, look how great center field is. As a position, they blow all other positions out of the water with an average of 3.37 WAR per player (2nd place is 3rd base at 3.17). These two positions have somewhat similar positional/replacement adjustments that are high. This means that the positions are hard to play and center field is currently in a renaissance of sorts.
On the pitching side, there appears to be absolutely no noticeable difference between lefties and righties. Even though there are far more right-handed starters, it appears that the importance of left-handed pitchers is overstated by the media. While there aren't as many of them, they don't appear to be any better than right-handed pitchers. Even left-handed relievers, who are often brought in in situations where they often face left-handed batters, aren't noticeably better than right-handed relievers. I believe this represents a fallacy in thinking. Teams don't *need* to have left-handers on their staffs for those staffs to be effective on a whole. Does it help with splits? Yes, but when you consider that being right-handed is much more common than being left-handed, how often does being a left-handed pitcher actually help?
And now, here are the positions ranked by their average WAR in one table and total WAR in another table:
Average WAR
| 1) CF |
| 2) 3B |
| 3) 2B |
| 4) LF |
| 5) 1B |
| 6) RF |
| 7) C |
| 8) SS |
| 9) SPL |
| 10) SPR |
| 11) DH |
| 12) RPL |
| 13) RPR |
Total WAR
| 1) SPR |
| 2) CF |
| 3) SPL |
| 4) 3B |
| 5) C |
| 6) RF |
| 7) LF |
| 8) 2B |
| 9) SS |
| 10) RPR |
| 11) 1B |
| 12) DH |
| 13) RPL |
I believe that this shows that positions such as SS, DH, and RPL are exceptionally thin as all three positions are low in the rankings in both average WAR and total WAR. Right now, Center Field takes the cake as the best overall position in baseball, in my opinion. Highest average WAR, 2nd most total WAR, and a depth of talent. Meanwhile, the DH position is noticeably weak because of the revolving door philosophy that comes with the position. An interesting note here is that starting pitching ranks high in total WAR (because there are a lot of starters) but ranks very low in average WAR. This could be that FIP-based WAR isn't telling the whole story, but it could also be that pitching is still really thin even though the current MLB environment seems to favor pitchers.
Part Two: wRC+
For those that are unaware, this is a measure of offensive performance. For the purposes of this part of the analysis, I am going to treat every individual measure of wRC+ as a point (so having a 100 wRC+ gives you one hundred points). Here are some fun facts about the spread of wRC+ in the league:
1) Players between 26-30 produce a staggering 53.51% of points within wRC+. Players between the ages of 31 and 37 produced 32.5% of the points. Young players (those younger than 26) produced only 12.47% of the points.
2) Note the chart below.
3) 30 year olds produced an average of 119 points of wRC+, which stands above every other age.
| Average wRC+ by Position (Points) | ||
| 1B | 127.11 | |
| 2B | 101.96 | |
| 3B | 114.97 | |
| C | 112.67 | |
| CF | 108.29 | |
| DH | 132.13 | |
| LF | 117.82 | |
| RF | 116.21 | |
| SS | 93.93 | |
First basemen and designated hitters produce a LOT more offense than everyone else. That being said the 3B, LF, and RF positions aren't doing too poorly either. Meanwhile, shortstops are anemic on offense and second basemen are pretty much on-par with the league average. One position of note is catchers. In the top 417 players, catchers produced their fair share of wRC+.
Overall, the offensive numbers are not shocking. The power positions produce more offense than others (and this is reflected in WAR). However, when you consider the positional adjustments that are given, the gap between first basemen and positions like, for example, catcher seems really small. While replacement level offense is really low for catchers, current MLB catchers seem to be just fine producing offensively (this is an example of something WAR wouldn't necessarily be able to tell you).
Part Three: BsR
Offense wasn't surprising, so perhaps base running will come with a surprise or two. In my opinion, base running is the second most underrated aspect of baseball (besides hitting for power, which I feel has actually become an underrated skill in the grand context of all things baseball). BsR is interesting, because base running is partly based in speed, partly based in skill, and partly based in overall opportunities. There are also different types of players that will play each position. For example, both Rickey Henderson and Adam Dunn have logged significant innings in left field. This means that the numbers will be fun to look at. Let's start:
| Average BsR by Position | ||
| 1B | -2.60 | |
| 2B | 1.66 | |
| 3B | -0.74 | |
| C | -1.69 | |
| CF | 3.50 | |
| DH | -2.56 | |
| LF | 1.35 | |
| RF | 1.17 | |
| SS | 1.71 | |
Well, if you're surprised by anything here, you shouldn't be. Outfielders and middle infielders are typically really good at running the bases. First basemen and designated hitters are terrible at it, and then there's a really interesting case: catchers. Now, having watched a lot of baseball, I can tell you that most catchers are pretty slow relative to the rest of the league. However, they are quite a bit better than their slow-moving counterparts at 1B and DH. To me, this could come down to the incredible baseball IQ it takes to be a MLB catcher. Catchers have to know game situations better than anyone. Also, since they work with pitchers all the time, they should be fairly good at reading them. This leads to better jumps and, I would assume, a lower frequency of being picked off. By knowing situations, they can get around the fact that they don't have speed (not trying to slam first baseman or DH's here, but come on...catchers are really smart). This difference could also come out of the fact that the mid-tier catchers simply aren't playing as much and don't rack up as much negative value as full-time poor base runners. However, if knowing situations is important to base running, then does experience help to alleviate the loss of speed with age? I have another chart for that!
| Average BsR by Age |
| 20 | 0.40 |
| 21 | 12.00 |
| 22 | 0.00 |
| 23 | 0.68 |
| 24 | -0.24 |
| 25 | 1.50 |
| 26 | 1.24 |
| 27 | 0.31 |
| 28 | 1.84 |
| 29 | 0.84 |
| 30 | 0.04 |
| 31 | 0.19 |
| 32 | 0.59 |
| 33 | -0.70 |
| 34 | 0.76 |
| 35 | 0.56 |
| 36 | -1.58 |
| 37 | -1.28 |
| 38 | 0.00 |
| 39 | 0.33 |
| 40 | 0.00 |
| 41 | -1.20 |
| 42 | 0.00 |
Take a look at the chart and then take into account the following list of points:
1) Players from ages 20-25 (now, this includes Mike Trout's ridiculous numbers from this year) produced a BsR of 18.61 last year.
2) Players from ages 26-30 produced a BsR of 4.27
3) Players from ages 31-35 produced 1.40 BsR
4) Most players are between 26-35.
As I mentioned in the disclaimer in the other post, I have to do some fake math to illustrate things. For example, the "average" 21 year old produced 12 BsR. This inflates the BsR for the first category quite a bit. Regardless, it would appear that being youthful and having more speed matters more in terms of BsR than knowing game situations. This doesn't surprise me, given the fact that the biggest part of base running is being fast as we've seen in the position breakdown (just look at how much better center fielders are at base running than everyone else).
Part Four: UZR
Offense and base running provided no real surprises other than the fact that catchers are better at both than expected. Perhaps the real surprise will come in defense:
| Total UZR by Position | ||
| 1B | 18.5 | |
| 2B | 59.2 | |
| 3B | 58.8 | |
| C | 29.8 | |
| CF | 79.7 | |
| DH | -8.8 | |
| LF | 38.1 | |
| RF | 33.9 | |
| SS | 77.7 | |
Even though they are playing easier positions or barely playing at all, first basemen and designated hitters are still terrible fielders by UZR on average. Now, there are some pretty inherent biases against first basemen by defensive metrics. Range is a big factor for most positions on defense, but it really isn't a big part of being a first baseman. A first baseman's biggest responsibility is receiving throws, and there just isn't a good way to show that within modern defensive metrics (unless the metric takes into account the ability to scoop). It doesn't just come down to scooping bad throws, either. Being really tall is pretty darn valuable at first base, because the range where throws can be received is increased. Anyway, UZR also isn't the best tool in the world for rating catchers. UZR can't take game calling or pitch framing into account (neither can other defensive metrics, actually). A lot of catcher defensive value isn't recognized by modern metrics. Finally, it's not surprising that SS and CF combine for the largest UZR. They are the two most important non-catcher positions defensively (in the minds of current baseball people...who knows, we may all be wrong in that assumption) and players often make MLB at those positions because they can flash the leather. For example, Brendan Ryan's bat is atrocious, but he locks down a starting job because he produces so much defensive value.
Using the points concept, like with wRC+, we can look at defense by position too:
| Average UZR by Age | ||
| 20 | 7.20 | |
| 21 | 11.40 | |
| 22 | 0.00 | |
| 23 | 3.88 | |
| 24 | 4.27 | |
| 25 | 3.69 | |
| 26 | 1.58 | |
| 27 | -0.21 | |
| 28 | -0.08 | |
| 29 | 3.79 | |
| 30 | 0.45 | |
| 31 | 2.95 | |
| 32 | -0.03 | |
| 33 | 1.65 | |
| 34 | 0.63 | |
| 35 | 0.32 | |
| 36 | 4.10 | |
| 37 | 1.31 | |
| 38 | 0.00 | |
| 39 | 2.90 | |
| 40 | 0.00 | |
| 41 | 1.80 | |
| 42 | 0.00 | |
1) Players between the ages of 20 and 28 produced nearly 31.7 points of UZR after adding up their averages. This was massive compared to the 19.9 points produced by players aged 29 to 42. Younger players are much better at defense.
2) Let's not forget that current center fielders are very young. Now, this is probably by design given that it would appear smart to move an aging player off of an important position like center field, but it is important. The most important defensive positions are young, which helps keep the defensive advantage in favor of youthful players.
3) Catchers tend to be older and are underrated by UZR. This could hurt the overall defensive ratings for older players. If catchers were properly rated, perhaps there wouldn't be a noticeable difference in defensive ability (but really, I think there would be because youth means physical skill, which means a better ability to go get and throw the ball).
Part Five: xFIP
This is the one section where I'm really limited because I can't do the proper math with the information I've been given. Going back to the points system, here is some info:
| Average Points of xFIP | ||
| RPL | 3.02 | |
| RPR | 3.15 | |
| SPL | 3.89 | |
| SPR | 3.88 | |
This is where numbers are, again, misleading. While right-handed starters and left-handed starters come out with the exact same average number of points for xFIP by position, there are a lot more right-handed starters. The same goes for right-handed relievers. That being said, even if I did have the time and resources to do the proper math with xFIP, I imagine there would still be no noticeable difference between right-handed and left-handed pitchers (as we've seen with WAR).
It is always funny seeing xFIP numbers for the better relievers, though. Relievers that are good enough to appear in the top 417 players in WAR are seriously good at their jobs. Think of it this way: only 11 left-handed relievers are in the top 417 players by WAR. Their average number of points sitting at 3.02 is not surprising at all.
Part Six: Overall Conclusions
I think there are a few things that can be taken away from this little sweep of the current MLB landscape:
1) Catchers that are actually in MLB are severely underrated. While their replacement levels are deservedly placed low, I think the perception of the catcher position is misleading. While most are not full time players (by design), it's apparent that these guys are better than they are given credit for. They averaged 112 points of wRC+, have defensive qualities that can't be accounted for by defensive metrics, and are better base runners than they are given credit for being. In fact, the years of experience fact really surprised me. I think even the league's backup catchers are severely underrated. Over 33 catchers produced at least a win of value, which means several reserve catchers were putting up strong value numbers even with limited playing time.
2) The first base position is surprisingly weak compared to previous years. While still better than the other positions offensively, the gap has been significantly reduced. I think this difference could be due to an emphasis of importance on coming up as a well-rounded player. Now that we know how valuable defense and base running are, coaches at all levels are making it known that being well-rounded or capable of playing a premium position is the fastest way to the majors. If I were a coach at the lower levels, I would put my best players at the most difficult positions until they proved that they couldn't play them (which appears to already be the case most of the time.)
3) Center field is experiencing the kind of renaissance that is rarely seen in MLB. While Mike Trout and Bryce Harper won't be regular center fielders this next season, we know they obviously have the ability to play the position. Even with Matt Kemp missing significant time and struggling at times in the second half, the position was still incredible across the board. In terms of defense there may be some bias towards the position, but center fielders are ridiculous across the board. Strong on offense, very strong on the bases, and outstanding defensively.
4) Shortstop is still the thinnest of all of the positions. The position produces less average value per player than the other offensive positions despite carrying a very low replacement level. Even though it is easy to produce value while at shortstop (again, relative to what the average player has to do to produce value at the average position), the position is so hard to play that staying on the field and producing enough to take advantage of this is incredibly hard. Injuries often plague the position, and the position was especially hurt by the loss of Troy Tulowtizki, who shines offensively and defensively.
5) Handedness is overrated for pitchers. The concept of a LOOGY (a left-handed specialist) is often frowned upon in the SABR community, and it appears to be for good reason. I think it simply comes as a result of the fact that more people are naturally right-handed than left-handed, so the opportunity for lefties to take advantage of their splits doesn't come often enough to be valuable. To be a modern MLB pitcher, you need to be able to get both lefties and righties out regardless of whether you are a starter or a reliever.
6) The phrase "in his prime" exists for a reason. An overwhelming amount of value came from players who are between the ages of 26-30. Some of this comes out of the fact that most starters don't start getting regular innings before the age of 23. They take longer to develop, which pushes their production back in later years. Still, the things I looked at certainly seemed to show that being youthful is more important than being experienced. It also showed, however, that MLB experience is an important part of the development process (otherwise, we'd see more value between the ages of 21-25). There's still a place for older players on a ball club, but your chances of fielding a championship-caliber roster are increased if you can have as many players in this age range as possible.
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